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ABSTRACT
The demand and use of renewable energy sources such as solar panels is steadily
increasing in today’s world. Renewable energy sources in distribution networks
effectively reduce the amount of load consumed by customers. Renewable energy
sources are also a solution to many environmental concerns. However, when these
sources of energy are added to downtown networks they interfere with the normal
operation of the protective relays and impose challenges such as unexpected tripping of
network protector relays. In this paper, the effects of network protector relay operation is
studied as a function of increasing photovoltaic (PV) penetration within the secondary
grid network. Additionally, network protector operation under faulted conditions within
the primary feeder network or network transformer is investigated. Finally, a solution is
proposed to detect abnormal or faulted conditions in the upstream network, and trip the
associated network protector relay only for these conditions. The proposed method,
when applied in the downtown distribution network, prevents the network protector
relays from erroneously tripping during minimum loading conditions and during high
levels of PV penetration within the secondary grid network.

xi

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The number of photovoltaic (PV) systems present in downtown distribution networks has been
steadily increasing over the years. These sources of renewable energy effectively reduce the
apparent load and excess energy flows towards the consumers [11]. These renewable energy
sources also assist in the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, a major environmental concern
[3]. Due to their proximity to the point of use, PV systems can reduce or eliminate line losses
[26]. This ultimately eliminates the need to build new transmission lines and large power plants
where there is increasing public opposition [3]. PV systems also provide a viable solution to
improved power quality and reliability, with the potential to reduce total outage times during
power outages. Developers are installing PV systems that are able to operate autonomously
when storms, fires, or other disturbances disrupt the electrical utilities [9] [15]. Additionally,
during minimum loading conditions such as early in the morning these sources may export
energy back to the utility grid in a transaction known as net metering. However, these loading
conditions along with increased levels of PV penetration in downtown distribution networks may
interfere with the normal operations of the protective devices and impose challenges such as
unexpected tripping in the network protectors. One example of this issue occurs in the Central
Business District of New Orleans, where residential, commercial and schools generating their
own power receive credit for unused power provided by the utility [9]. These areas, however,
are not allowed to interconnect their generation due to safety and reliability concerns [9]. A
network protector (NP) relay is a device installed on the low-voltage side of each network
transformer. The normal direction of current flow in the downtown network is unidirectional
from the utility to the customers on the secondary side of the network transformer. However, the
direction of current flow will reverse during short circuits on the primary feeder network, or
when the PV generation within the downtown distribution network exceeds the load demand.
In the downtown distribution network, multiple feeders supply power to a number of
transformers which are interconnected together on the secondary side to serve multiple loads.
When a fault occurs in the upstream network, the network protector disconnects the transformer
that sees the fault current to isolate it. Then, the network protector protects the transformer of
the disconnected circuit by disconnecting the downstream network and isolating the fault in the
primary feeder or network transformer. A three-phase power directional relay called master relay
provides this tripping mechanism. The relay monitors the magnitude and direction of the current
flowing through the network protector when the network protector is closed for the tripping
mechanism. This relay trips the protector when it senses reverse power flow from the secondary
grid towards the fault located within the primary feeder network. The network protector
automatically closes when the voltage on the transformer side of the open network protector is
higher in magnitude, and is in phase with or leading the voltage on the secondary side of the
protector after the faulted circuit is repaired and re-energized.
The network protector is an important protective device in the downtown distribution network
because it ensures reliable and continuous operation even if one or more feeders are lost due to a
fault or other abnormal conditions. The presence of renewable sources in the downtown
distribution network presents a few challenges. One of the major issues that we are facing today
is the problem of distinguishing an abnormal or fault condition from excess power flow coming
1

from the secondary grid network. The network protector senses power flow towards the utility in
both cases, and trips to prevent the backflow to the primary feeder network. The network
protector is designed to reclose for power flow from the utility to the downtown network.
However, without synchronizing capabilities, it is possible that the network protector may try to
reclose out of sync on a downtown network that has been islanded [5]. Due to these challenges,
many utilities that have networks have not been allowing their customers that have PV systems
(or any generating system) to connect to the grid. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory
(NREL) has outlined six cases of utilities successfully implementing PV systems onto their
system. These utilities usually implement the interconnection so that the energy produced in the
downtown network is not fed back towards the grid. This is accomplished by several methods
outline below [1]:
1. Size the PV system lower than the minimum daytime load at the customer meter. If the
total demand data for the secondary network can be gathered for a considerable amount of
time, the amount of PV penetration in the downtown distribution network can be limited
such that it will always produce less energy than the secondary network consumes at all
times. This ensures that the utility is always transmitting power towards the load in the
secondary network.
2. Install a minimum import relay (MIR) or a reverse power relay. The MIR disconnects the
PV system if the powers flow from the utility drops below a set value. The reverse power
relay will disconnect the PV system in the secondary network from the utility if the power
flow from the utility drops to zero or reverses direction.
3. Install a dynamically controlled inverter (DCI) to monitor the amount of power coming in
to the customer location and decrease PV penetration if the load decreases below a specific
level. The energy flow is monitored at the main feeder and a control signal is sent to the
inverter which initiates a reduction in generated power, if required.
4. Allow smaller PV systems to connect to the network which decrease the chances of
sending power back to the utility.
All of the methods above, however, limit the amount of energy produced by solar panels in the
downtown network. Method 4 places limits on the size of PV systems installed at the customer’s
site, while methods 2 and 3 control the output as a function of the power flow in the network.
The minimum load identification (Method 1) method can fail to work if the load becomes lower
than previously evaluated.
The methods mentioned above allow customers to interconnect their PV systems onto the
grid, at the expense of limiting the available energy in the secondary network. Other solutions to
reverse power flow as a result of high PV penetration revolve around implementing changes
within the downtown network on the customer’s side [4]. Some of these alternatives are listed
below:
1. Decrease the network’s series impedance so that it has low voltage drop along its length.
This essentially increases the voltage in the primary feeder network, but can become
costly.
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2. Require customer loads to operate at improved power factor, reducing the need for a higher
voltage in the primary feeder network.
3. Require customers with large loads to shed their loads when the voltage in the downtown
network drops below a certain threshold.
4. Discretionary loads can be used when the downtown network voltage is high to provide
additional load for excess power to flow.
5. Provide a means of energy storage to use up the extra power provided by PV.
Since the existing solutions impose limitations on the amount of solar generation present in
secondary networks, a new method is proposed to prevent the undesired tripping of the network
protector relay. A solution is proposed to be able to detect reverse power flow caused by a fault
condition, and trip the network protector to isolate the fault. This solution improves the
efficiency of the PV systems installed in the downtown network by allowing the transformers to
remain in service for higher levels of PV penetration, and allowing the downtown network to
provide more power to the local network and the utility system.
We begin by looking at theory used in load flow studies, including a brief overview of the perunit calculations used throughout the study, as well as a review of the Newton-Raphson iterative
method used to run load flow simulations. Next, we examine the operation of the network
protector relay by looking at the trip and reclose characteristics. We also provide a background
on secondary distribution networks, including spot and secondary grid mesh networks. This
study will examine different arrangements of distributed generation (DG) located within the
downtown network to determine if the location of DGs have a major effect on the operation of
the network protectors and the voltage profile within the network. We also study the downtown
distribution network under peak load conditions, and look at the worst case scenario of minimum
loads with the addition of distributed generation in the downtown distribution network. Reverse
power flows in the entire downtown network will be studied as a result of increased PV
penetration. The effect of clouds on the operation of network protectors is then studied, as this
case also has an effect on the voltage stability and available power from the PV systems. Finally
this study examines various case studies with different levels of PV penetration present in the
secondary network, with the occurrence of fault conditions in the feeder network. We are then
able to demonstrate the proposed solution that will distinguish a fault from excess PV penetration
in the downtown distribution network.
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CHAPTER 2. LOAD FLOW ANALYSIS
2.1 Per-Unit System
Performing circuit analysis with transformers can become tedious due to the different
voltage levels in systems. The per-unit method is a system that eliminates the need to
transform the voltages at every transformer in the system. In the per unit system the
currents, voltages, impedances, powers, and other electrical quantities are not measured in
their usual SI units (amperes, volts, watts, etc.). Instead, each quantity is measured as
some decimal fraction of a base level. Quantities can be expressed in the per unit system
by the following equations [13]:
P.U. volts =

actual
volts
base

(1)

P.U. amps =

actual
amps
base

(2)

P.U. ohms =

actual
ohms
base

(3)

The first step in the per-unit calculation process involves selecting the system kVA which
is usually chosen based on one of the predominant pieces of equipment or a round number
such as 10,000 [13]. Next, a voltage base (VLL) is selected which is usually the nominal
line voltage at that level. The other base voltages can be determined by the turn-to-turn
ratios of the transformers in the network. The base impedance can be calculated for each
voltage level, and the per-unit values can be determined. The following equations show
the relationships between the electrical quantities used in per-unit calculations:

kVAbase
3  kVbase

(4)

kV 2 base
1000
kVAbase

(5)

I base 
Z base 

kVAbase  3  kVbase  I base

(6)

The main advantage of the per-unit system is the fact that the transformers can be
removed from the calculations since transformer turns ratios are now 1:1. Once the perunit values have been calculated for an entire system, the actual values can then be
determined by multiplying each per-unit value by the associated base value.
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2.2 Power Flow Studies
Power flow studies attempt to determine the voltage magnitude and angle as well as the
real and reactive power flows for each bus in the electrical system under balanced three-phase
steady state conditions [14]. Typically, the load power consumption at all of the buses and the
power produced at each generator are provided to run these studies. These studies determine if
the system voltages remain within their limits under different loading scenarios, and whether
equipment such as transformers and lines are overloaded [13]. Figure 2.1 shows the conventions
used during the power flow studies.
Varsin

Power flow out of network

Power flow into network
Watts

Wattsout

Wattsin
θ
MVA

Vars
P

Varsout
Figure 2.1— Power flow diagram
The basic calculation process is to solve a non-linear equation that contains:


P – the active power into the network



Q – the reactive power into the network



Vmag – the magnitude of the bus voltage



θ – the angle of the bus voltage referred to a common reference

The definition of the load flow problem involves two of the four parameters listed above at
each bus, while the other parameters are solved. For generators (PV buses), P and Vmag are
usually chosen because the power and voltages are usually controlled via the governor and
excitation control systems, respectively. The slack bus is a special generator bus that serves as
the reference bus for the power system. The slack bus maintains a fixed voltage, while supplying
whatever real or reactive power needed to make the power flows in the system balance.
5

The magnitude of the voltage is kept constant by adjusting the synchronous generator
connected to the bus. Due to the physical characteristics of generation and load, the terminal
parameters at each load bus is usually described in terms of its active and reactive powers (PQ
buses) [13].
2.3 Newton-Raphson Method
The Newton-Raphson power flow method was used to determine the voltage magnitudes
and angles at each bus in the downtown network. To execute the Newton-Raphson method, all
data (including line impedances and bus loads) of the equipment within the network must be
converted to their per unit values on common bases as outlined in section 2.1. Next, the
admittance matrix (Ybus) is formed using the following guidelines for admittances connected
between nodes i and j:


Add the admittance to the (i,i) position of the the Ybus matrix



Add the admittance to the (j,j) position of the the Ybus matrix



Add the negative of the admittance to the (i,j) position of the the Ybus matrix



Add the negative of the admittance to the (j,i) position of the the Ybus matrix

With this information, the power balance equations are ready to be solved:
(7)
(8)
where:


vi – Voltage at node i



vj – Voltage at node j



δi – Angle of voltage at node i



δj – Angle of voltage at node j



γij – Angle between bus i and bus j



yij – i,j component of the Ybus matrix



PG,i – Real power generated



PL,i – Load real power



PT,i –Real power transmitted



QG,i– Reactive power generated



QL,i – Load reactive power



QT,i –Reactive power transmitted
6

The power balance equations are solved using the following iterative process until the power
balance equation converges to zero.
1. Estimate the values of δi and |vi| for the state variables
2. Use the estimates to calculate Pi,calc & Qi,calc, mismatches, ∆Pi , ∆Qi, and the Jacobian.
3. Solve the matrix equations for ∆δi and

correction.

4. Add the solved corrections in the initial estimates
a. δi = δi + ∆δi
b. |vi| = |vi| + ∆|vi| = |vi| (1+

)

5. Use the new values δi and |vi| as starting values for the next iteration.
2.4 Load Flow Program
The Newton-Raphson iterative method was utilized via MATLAB to obtain load flow
solutions throughout this study. To run the load flow simulations, the actual values provided
from Entergy had to be converted into per unit values. We selected an apparent power base of
1000 KVA and calculated the voltage and impedance bases below:

(10)
(11)
(12)

(13)
(14)
(15)

(16)
(17)
(18)
7

Table 1 below shows the values that were used for the base values throughout the study.
Table 1—Base Values
APPARENT POWER (S)
VBASE
ZBASE

13.2KV Network
1000KVA
13.2KV
174.24

408V Network 208 Network
1000KVA
1000KVA
408V
208V
0.043264
0.2304

The modeling data provided from Entergy was converted into bus and line matrixes as input
for the load flow program. The bus data consisted of 1,209 nodes/loads with each node
containing information on:


Bus voltage



Bus voltage angle



Real power generated/consumed at bus



Reactive power generated/consumed at bus

There were 433 secondary grid nodes, 408 feeder network nodes, 215 nodes within the grid
vaults, 7 nodes for the origination points of each network at the substation, and 152 spot vault
nodes.
The line matrix consisted of 1, 412 lines with each line containing information on:


Series resistance in each line



Series reactance in each line



Susceptance in each line



Impedance of each transformer

PV systems that are connected to the electric grid are designed to inject all of the real power
produced by PV modules into the secondary grid [16]. They control the amount of power
regardless of the voltage level, so we represented locations of PV penetration as negative
constant power loads in the simulation [26]. Additionally, standards such as IEEE 1547 and
UL1741 state that the inverter “shall not actively regulate the voltage at the PCC (Point of
Common Coupling)” [16] [12]. Therefore, PV systems are designed to operate at unity power
factor because this condition will produce the most real power and energy.
Essentially, the PV penetration reduces the amount of real power consumed at the connected bus.
When more PV penetration is added the bus node can actually generate real power onto the grid.
It is known that high levels of PV penetration which results in replacing generating units with
distributed PV systems can limit the amount of available reactive power [12]. The task of
supplying the reactive power is usually undertaken by the electric utility [11]. This is shown
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graphically in Figure 2.2 where the grid-connected inverter supplies the real power to the load
and grid, leaving the utility the task of supplying the required reactive power for the loads.

Figure 2.2— Power injected into secondary grid due to PV penetration
When high levels of PV penetration are present, the dynamic performance of the system can
be affected when reactive power supply is interrupted during a system disturbance, such as a
fault, within the electric utility [12]. These issues will be examined further in Chapter 9.
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CHAPTER 3. OPERATION OF NETWORK PROTECTOR RELAY
3.1 Operation
Currently, Entergy uses network protectors manufactured by Richards manufacturing.
The Richards 313NP Network Protector that is widely used in the Entergy grids consists of a
circuit breaker, a motor operated mechanism, and an Electronic Technology Inc. (ETI)
microprocessor-based network protector relay. The network protector relay responds to power
flowing to and from the secondary distribution network. If a fault occurs in the primary feeder
network or in a connected transformer, or if the substation feeder breaker is de-energized by
opening the circuit breaker, the network protector (in sensitive trip mode) will energize the
network protector’s trip coil to open the network protector. After the fault clears in the primary
network, and if the transformer voltage is greater than the secondary voltage, and if the
transformer voltage angle leads the angle of the network voltage, then the network protector
relay will energize the reclose output contact and close the protector [2].
3.2 Trip Modes


Sensitive Trip – The network protector relay will trip the protector when the net reverse
power flow exceeds the set point. Range: -1.0 to -1000.0 mA.



Sensitive Trip Delay – The sensitive trip criteria must be met for the duration of the time
delay period before the network protector will open. Range: 1 to 255 cycles.
Insensitive Trip – The protector will not open during normal system conditions. It will
open when the “Insensitive Current” set point is exceeded on one of the phases (during a
fault condition). Range: 0 to 15 amps
Watt-Var – The network protector relay will rotate the trip region to ensure that the
network protector will open under certain conditions. Range: 0 to 15 amps




Figure 3.1—Sensitive Trip Characteristic [2]
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3.3 Reclose Modes


Reclose Voltage – Minimum three phase average differential voltage required to close the
protector. Range: 0.0 to 15.0 volts



Reclose Angle – The phase angle between the transformer voltage and the secondary
network voltage must be greater or equal to this setting. Range: -60 to +30 degrees



Reclose Time Delay - Large regenerative loads such as elevators or feeder voltage
fluctuations can cause momentary reversal of power. In such cases, an erroneous tripping
may occur and hence time delay is used to delay the reverse power trip function to avoid
this faulty operation. Time delayed trip restrains the relay from tripping for a user-defined
time on low levels of reverse power. Range: 1 to 255 cycles

Figure 3.2—Reclose Characteristic [2]

11

CHAPTER 4. OVERVIEW OF DISTRIBUTION SECONDARY NETWORK SYSTEMS
Secondary networks consisting of spot and network vaults were first developed in the 1920s
to serve several customers located primarily in downtown areas of major cities [6] [7]. Most spot
and grid vaults are fed by two to four transformers, each from a different feeder, but a few grid
vaults are fed from single transformers. This redundancy increases the reliability of the network,
allowing loads to remain in service with the loss of one of its sources. For example, a faulted
primary feeder or transformer connection to the secondary network is isolated within a few
cycles and service is continually provided to the load without any interruption [6].
Network transformers and protectors may be located in vaults below the street or sidewalk,
above the street on pole-supported structures, or throughout high-rise buildings [6]. Figure 4.1
shows the components of a network unit is located inside the vaults.

Figure 4.1—Network Unit Components [6]
As shown in Figure 4.1, the primary side of the network transformer is typically delta
connected, with the secondary connected grounded wye to supply voltage to the grid and spot
network customers. The cable limiters (fuses) operate for arcing faults within the vault, and
help protect the insulation of the secondary cables from excessive heating.
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A spot network is a type of secondary network distribution system that is usually used to
serve a single customer or multiple customers in a single building such as apartment
buildings, high-rise office buildings, and hospitals [5]. Figure 4.2 shows an example of a
typical spot network configuration.

Figure 4.2—Example of spot network configuration [6]
Grid networks are designed to serve all network customer loads during peak hours, with an N-1
or N-2 contingency (1 or 2 network feeders out of service). The low voltage circuits of the grid
networks are highly meshed and served by several network units. This arrangement ensures that
the secondary load will not be interrupted in case of an issue with the transformer or within the
primary feeder network. Grid networks are also referred to as an area network or street network.
Figure 4.3 shows an example of a typical grid network configuration. Instantaneous and timedelayed relays is typically utilized on each feeder within the primary network for overcurrent
protection.
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Figure 4.3— Example of grid network configuration [6]
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CHAPTER 5. MODEL OF DOWNTOWN NETWORK
5.1 Model Parameters
The network model provided from Entergy consisted of seven 13.2 kV underground feeders
(referred to as Feeder 1 through Feeder 7), each feeding spot network vaults (277/480V or
120/208V) and secondary grid vaults (120/208V). Entergy also provided an excel workbook of
the modeling data that included both primary and secondary nodes along with impedances and
lengths of line sections. Information for transformers located in the spot and grid vaults
included: impedance ratings, primary and secondary connections, and voltage ratios. A list of
node locations along with peak levels of all spot and grid network loads was provided. The peak
load demand for the entire downtown network in this study is 33.6MW. All seven feeders
originated from the same substation transformer. Figure 5.1 below shows all seven feeder
breakers originating from the main substation.

Figure 5.1—Feeder network breakers
Each feeder breaker feeds a feeder network, where the spot and grid vaults are located.
Figure 5.2 shows a one line diagram of feeder network 1 with relative locations of spot and grid
vaults. Feeder networks 2 through 7 have similar arrangements.
The following node nomenclature was used throughout the study:
•

F1_Node005 = Node 5 on Feeder 1 (13.2kV)

•

Grid_005 = Node 5 on secondary network grid (120/208V)
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•

GV03_Load, GV03_Fdr7, or GV03_Node1 = a node located inside grid vault
GV_03

•

SV04_Load, SV04_Fdr1, or SV04_Node5 = a node located inside spot vault
SV_04

•

Sub_Fdr3 = Origination point of Feeder 3 at the substation

Figure 5.2—Feeder 1 Network
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CHAPTER 6. VOLTAGE ANALYSIS
6.1 PV Penetration Only in Grid Mesh Network
This section is devoted the analysis of the downtown network under peak and minimum
loading conditions. We evenly distributed the renewable sources at 24 load nodes throughout the
grid network. For the simulations the total peak load was distributed equally among all 24 PV
sources within the secondary grid. At this level, the total PV generation within the grid network
was equal to the total peak load demand (Total PV penetration = 33.6MW). During the
simulations, we increased the PV penetration from 5%, to 15%, up to 150% of total peak demand
to observe the effect of network protector operation and stability with increasing PV penetration.
The penetration levels are defined as the ratio of the real power output of the PV module to the
peak load at the node. For example, if the peak real power consumed at a particular node is
10kw, 1.5kw of power would be generated at this location with 15% PV penetration present.

(19)

6.1.1 Voltage Profiles under Different PV Arrangements
After the model of the downtown network was completed, the renewable sources were
inserted into the grid network. These renewable sources essentially reduced the amount of real
power that was consumed at the loads. At high levels of generation, these renewable sources
transmit real power to nearby nodes and other loads. For our analysis, we studied three different
arrangements of renewable sources in the grid network. Next, a comparison was made among all
three PV arrangements to determine if the location of the PV penetration would have a
significant effect on our simulations. Tables 2-5 show the per unit voltages in the grid network
for 0%, 5%, 15%, and 30% PV penetration using different arrangements. The voltage profiles of
all the arrangements at 5%, 15%, and 30% of PV penetration are shown in Figures 6.1-6.3.
Table 2—per unit grid voltages with no PV Penetration in network
0% PV Penetration

Base Case

Minimum Voltage (pu)

0.916248

Maximum Voltage (pu)

0.99728

Mean Voltage (pu)

0.9758183
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Figure 6.1—Grid Voltages for all arrangements with 5% PV penetration
Table 3—per unit grid voltages with 5% PV penetration
5% PV Penetration

Arrangement 1

Arrangement 2

Arrangement 3

Minimum Voltage (pu)

0.918112

0.901363

0.918585

Maximum Voltage (pu)

0.997398

0.99801

0.99774

Mean Voltage (pu)

0.977865

0.977427

0.977885

Figure 6.2—Grid Voltages for all arrangements with 15% PV penetration
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Table 4—per unit grid voltages with 15% PV penetration
15% PV Penetration

Arrangement 1

Arrangement 2

Arrangement 3

Minimum Voltage (pu)

0.921712

0.910074

0.923127

Maximum Voltage (pu)

1.012061

1.011921

1.007138

Mean Voltage (pu)

0.981671

0.981145

0.981743

Figure 6.3—Grid Voltages for all arrangements with 30% PV penetration
Table 5—per unit grid voltages with 30% PV penetration
30% PV Penetration

Arrangement 1

Arrangement 2

Arrangement 3

Minimum Voltage (pu)

0.9268

0.921752

0.929644

Maximum Voltage (pu)

1.036362

1.04793

1.024666

Mean Voltage (pu)

0.986753

0.986083

0.986922

No major differences were observed with the voltage profiles among the different topologies
at low levels of PV penetration. However, at high levels of penetration we observed differences
with the stability of each arrangement. For example, under peak loading conditions both
arrangements 1 and 3 became unstable after 135% PV penetration. Arrangement 2, however,
was determined to be less stable at high levels of PV penetration, becoming unstable when PV
penetration exceeded 90%. These results are shown in Figure 6.4. This result provides a
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framework for ongoing research to examine the optimal placement of PV modules within
distribution networks.

Figure 6.4—Network protector operations in grid network
6.1.2 Renewable Sources with Peak Loading
In this section, the voltage profile of the feeder networks and the grid networks are studied
under peak loading conditions. The peak loading information at each bus was provided from
Entergy. The PV penetration was increased from 5%, to 15%, to 150% of the total peak load in
increments of 15%. This allowed us to study the effect of the renewable sources under peak
loads throughout the feeder and grid networks. Figures 6.6 and 6.7 show similar results for
arrangements 2 and 3 under peak loading conditions.

Figure 6.5—Voltage profile for Arrangement 1 under peak loads
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Figure 6.5 shows that the voltage within the grid network for arrangement 1 increases as a result
of more PV penetration within the grid network. Cases where PV penetration equals 5%, 15%,
and 30% of the peak loads were simulated.

Figure 6.6—Voltage profile for Arrangement 2 under peak loads

Figure 6.7—Voltage profile for Arrangement 3 under peak loads
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6.1.3 Renewable Sources with Minimum Loading
In this section, the voltage profile of the grid network is studied under minimum loading
conditions. In this case, the minimum loads were calculated as 16% of the peak loads. The PV
penetration was increased from 5%, to 15%, to 150% of the load in increments of 15%. This
allowed us to study the effect of the renewable sources under minimum loads throughout the
feeder and grid networks. Figure 6.8 shows that the voltage within the grid network for
arrangement 1 increases as a result of more PV penetration within the grid network. Cases
where PV penetration equals 5%, 15%, and 30% of the peak loads were simulated. Figures 6.9
and 6.10 show similar results for arrangements 2 and 3 under peak loading conditions.

Figure 6.8— Voltage profile for Arrangement 1 under minimum loads

Figure 6.9— Voltage profile for Arrangement 2 under minimum loads
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Figure 6.10— Voltage profile for Arrangement 3 under minimum loads
We see an improvement in the voltage profile for all arrangements at low levels of PV
penetration. Unless explicitly stated, the remainder of the simulations in this study are performed
using arrangement 1.

6.2 PV Penetration in Grid Mesh & Spot Networks
Until this point, all distributed generation has been present only within the grid mesh
network. In this section, the effect of PV penetration within both the grid mesh and spot
networks are observed. For our simulations, we inserted PV penetration at 6 locations within the
spot networks. At peak load conditions, these locations consumed 3.66MW (10.89% of total
peak demand). These loads, however, now generate 5%, 15%, up to 150% (of peak load) of their
loads. The remaining PV penetration at each level is distributed equally among the original 24
grid nodes. As an example, at 100% PV penetration 3.66MW is generated within the spot
network. Within the grid network 29.94MW (33.6MW – 3.66MW = 29.94MW) is generated
among the 24 grid loads. This essentially decreases the PV penetration within the grid mesh
network, with the addition of renewables within the spot networks.
6.2.1 Renewable Sources with Peak Loading
Figure 6.11 shows the voltage profile of the grid mesh network with PV penetration in the
grid and spot networks. At low penetration levels, the distributed generation provides voltage
support for multiple grid mesh nodes. However, we begin to see grid voltages above 5%
nominal rating when the PV penetration exceeds 60%. Additionally, we begin to see a decline in
bus voltages when the PV penetration levels exceed 120% of the peak loads.
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Figure 6.11— Voltage profile with PV penetration in grid mesh & spot network (peak loads)
6.2.2 Renewable Sources with Minimum Loading
Figure 6.12 shows the voltage profile of the grid mesh network with PV penetration in the
grid and spot networks. We see more severe voltage problems in the case of minimum loads. At
45% PV penetration, there are locations where voltage levels increased a 5% above of its
nominal rating. Additionally, we begin to see a decline in bus voltages when the PV penetration
levels exceed 105% of the peak loads. This issue can be attributed to the loss of reactive power
due to the increased PV penetration, which only provides real power.

Figure 6.12— Voltage profile with PV penetration in grid mesh & spot network (min. loads)
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We can take a closer look at some of the grid nodes by observing Figure 6.13. Figure 6.13
displays the effect of increased PV penetration on both the voltage and phase at the Grid_154
node. The voltage at this node is increased from 0.952 p.u. at 0% PV to 0.974 p.u. at 150% PV.
In this case, the renewable source provides voltage support for this large load (422.9 kVA).

Figure 6.13— Grid_154 voltages under minimum loads
However, there are cases where the addition of renewable sources impacts the network
negatively. For a load located at Grid_357, a PV source is also installed, similar to the previous
case at Grid_154. In this case, however, we experience high voltages that can cause issues
within the network. For example, the PV source causes the bus voltage to increase from 0.99
p.u. at 0% PV to 1.08 p.u. at 150% PV penetration. This high level is above the ANSI C84.1
voltage level (5%).

Figure 6.14— Grid_357 voltages under minimum loads
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CHAPTER 7. EFFECTS OF NETWORK PROTECTOR OPERATION
7.1 PV Penetration in Grid Network
In this section we will look at the effects of network protector operation on the grid network
when PV penetration is initially added only to the grid network in our simulations. We can
visualize a scenario during the day where the PV modules are initially off, and then all turned on
at the same time. The penetration levels will vary as a function of the available sunlight
throughout the day. For these simulations, there are no communications present between the
network protectors within the grid network. The sensitive trip setting is set to trip when 1.5% of
rated transformer current flows from the grid network towards the utility. Also, reclose
operations of the network protectors were disabled; so, once the network protector relays trip, the
transformer will remain open throughout the remainder of the simulation. In addition to the
network protector, the transformer protection will disconnect overloaded transformers when the
loading exceeds 100% of the rated load of the transformer. Figure 6.1 below shows the amount
of transformers that will be disconnected when we connect the network protectors in the
downtown network. We observed that the simulation did not converge to a solution when the
penetration levels exceeded 120% and 135% (of the peak loads) for the cases of minimum and
peak loads respectively. This indicates that the network becomes unstable at these levels of PV
penetration due to a loss of reactive power from the utility.
The peak loads used were
calculated at 100% of the loading information provided from Entergy. The minimum load was
calculated as 16% of the peak loads.

Figure 7.1— Transformers disconnected under peak and minimum loading
As expected, we see that with increased PV penetration within the grid network, we will
experience more reverse power flows. We see even more reverse power flows in the case of
minimum loads. This is consistent with the fact that power will flow towards the feeder network
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once the load requirement is met at each grid load. Minimum loads require less power, and will
therefore cause more power to flow towards the feeder networks than the case of peak loads.
7.1.1 Reverse Power Flows in Distribution Lines (PV Penetration in Grid Network)
Next, we examine the reverse power flows in the distribution lines as PV penetration is
increased. The downtown network consists of 1,412 lines/transformer connections including:


169 network protector relays (for each network transformer)



717 line connections in the grid mesh network



118 line connections in the spot network



408 line connections in the primary feeder networks

Figures 7.2 and 7.3 examine the power flows for the lines within the distribution network
when PV penetration is increased. Generally, we can expect to see an increase in reverse power
flows as PV penetration is increased. It is interesting to note that although the spot networks are
not generating any real power in this case, line sections within the spot networks experience
reverse power flows. Increased penetration within the grid network has an effect on the power
flows in the spot networks. In general, PV penetration in the grid network affects the power flow
in the primary feeder networks, which will alter the power flows within the spot networks as
well.

Figure 7.2— Reverse power flows with PV penetration in Grid Mesh Network (peak loads)
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Figure 7.3— Reverse power flows with PV penetration in Grid Mesh Network (min. loads)
It is interesting to note that although no PV penetration is present within the spot networks
for these simulations, we still experience reverse power flows in the spot networks. Although
the secondary grid mesh and spot networks are not connected at the loads, their primary
networks are tied together as shown in Figure 7.4. In this case, both transformers provide the
power to the SV27_Load without PV penetration present in the network. The sources for the
feeds originate from feeder networks 3 and 5. However, when PV penetration is added, the
direction of power flow is reversed at the transformer coming from feeder network 3. Therefore,
we see that PV penetration within the grid mesh network can cause reverse power flows, and
even network protector operations in the spot networks.

Figure 7.4— Power flows for SV_27 with no PV Penetration
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7.1.2 PV Penetration and Transformer Loading
Next, we add the effect of transformer overloads to the simulation. Figure 7.5 shows the
number of transformers that will be disconnected due to reverse power flows and transformer
overloads under peak loading conditions using arrangement 1. We see that we begin to
experience transformer overloads when the PV penetration in the grid network exceeds 45% of
the load. As the PV penetration is increased, more network protectors will experience more
reverse power flows and trip. With fewer transformers in the downtown network, the power has
fewer paths to flow towards the load and can overload the remaining lines and transformers in
the network. This process may provoke a cascading event where overcurrent relays operate as a
result of the increased power flows. Consequently, the voltage profiles within the secondary grid
network can be seriously affected and initiate a voltage collapse situation [3].

Figure 7.5— Transformers disconnected under peak loading conditions
7.2 PV Penetration in Grid & Spot Networks
7.2.1 Reverse power flows in distribution lines (PV penetration in grid & spot networks)
Figures 7.6 and 7.7 details the reverse power flows in all of the lines in the distribution
network for these simulations. For all cases, we see an increase in reverse power flows as PV
penetration is increased in both networks. However, the addition of renewables within the spot
network provided an increase in voltage stability for the network. We see that under peak and
minimum load conditions the downtown network is now stable for all cases (up to 150% PV
penetration).
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Figure 7.6— Reverse power flows with PV penetration in Grid & Spot Networks (peak
loads)

Figure 7.7— Reverse power flows with PV penetration in Grid & Spot Networks (min.
loads)
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CHAPTER 8. CLOUD EFFECTS
The amount of power that the PV sources deliver is directly proportional to the amount of
sunlight it receives. Additionally, the presence of clouds in the downtown network can cause
voltage fluctuations in short periods of time when a significant amount of energy is provided via
PV penetration. This section is devoted to studying these effects on the downtown network. We
will consider the cases when 5%, 15%, and 30% PV penetration is present in the downtown
network. We performed these simulations with PV arrangement 1. In all simulations, 6
transformers are out of service in the network, and one additional transformer is disconnected
due to the existence of reverse power without PV penetration. For the simulations, we divided
the grid network into Areas A, B, and C. The cloud covers 1/3 of the grid network. For each
case, this cloud passes over the network from Area A, to Area B, and finally exiting in Area C.
With the cloud covering part of the grid network the PV radiation at the renewable sources is
reduced 70%. In each case, a “snapshot” of the network is obtained. We use this information
to study the voltage profile as a result of the presence of clouds.
8.1 Clouds with 5% PV Penetration
For the first simulation with the clouds in the downtown network peak loading conditions are
present with 5% PV penetration. A total of 1.68MW (5% of total load) of PV penetration is
added to the grid network. Three additional network protector relays operate as a result of the
PV penetration. With 5% PV penetration present in the downtown network a random cloud
passes over each area and a “snapshot of the system is obtained. The renewable sources only
generate 1.29MW when the cloud is passing through the area.

(20)
(21)
Table 6 shows the per-unit calculations for the voltages as the cloud passes through the network
with 5% PV penetration present.
Table 6— per unit grid voltages with clouds in Areas A, B, & C (5% PV Penetration)
No Clouds

Clouds in A

Clouds in B

Clouds in C

Mean

0.97787198

0.97760624

0.9775441

0.97708528

Minimum

0.91811449

0.91800278

0.91697057

0.91809696

Maximum

0.99739809

0.9973206

0.99739095

0.99739453
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Figure 8.1 shows a voltage profile of the grid network with a cloud covering 1/3 of the area.

Figure 8.1—Grid Network Voltage with clouds in Areas A, B, & C (5% PV Penetration)
We see that the clouds did not change the voltage profile significantly for the case with 5%
PV penetration in the downtown network. Also no additional transformers operated with the
presence of clouds in the network.
8.2 Clouds with 15% PV Penetration
The simulation is repeated again for 15% PV penetration. In this case 5.04MW is added to
the grid network causing an additional three network protectors to operate. With the presence of
the cloud, the total PV penetration reduces to 3.86MW. Table 7 shows the per-unit calculations
for the voltages as the cloud passes through the network with 15% PV penetration present.
Table 7— per unit grid voltages with clouds in Areas A, B, & C (15% PV Penetration)
No Clouds

Clouds in A

Clouds in B

Clouds in C

Mean

0.9805966

0.97982646

0.97959543

0.97459128

Minimum

0.9217445

0.92138914

0.9183868

0.92169502

Maximum

1.0120522

1.01198933

1.01190406

1.00066861
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Snapshots of the voltages are provided in Figure 8.2.

208V Grid Network Voltages with 15% PV
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Grid_361
Grid_379
Grid_397
Grid_415
Grid_433

0.86

Grid Nodes

Figure 8.2—Grid Network Voltage with clouds in Areas A, B, & C (15% PV Penetration)
For the case with 15% PV penetration present, we observed a small decrease in the grid
network voltages with the clouds present. We also observed one network protector trip with
clouds present in both Areas A and B. No transformers became overloaded with the presence of
the cloud.
8.3 Clouds with 30% PV Penetration
Next, we observed the passage of a cloud with 30% PV penetration present. With the cloud
present, the total PV generated in the downtown network reduces from 10.08MW to 7.73MW.
Table 8 shows the per-unit calculations for the voltages as the cloud passes through the network
with 30% PV penetration present.
Table 8—per unit grid voltages with clouds in Area A, B, & C (30% PV Penetration)
No Clouds

Clouds in A

Clouds in B

Clouds in C

Mean

0.9859777

0.98441874

0.98371357

0.97399468

Minimum

0.926892

0.92618371

0.92044291

0.92641014

Maximum

1.0311518

1.0311302

1.02973957

1.01606723
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Snapshots of the grid voltages are provided in Figure 8.3.
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Figure 8.3—Grid Network Voltage with clouds in Areas A, B, & C (30% PV Penetration)
For the case of PV penetration = 30%, the cloud first arrives in Area A, causing 16 additional
network protectors to operate. These transformers remain open throughout the remainder of the
simulation. The cloud then passes over Area B, causing 3 more network protectors to operate
and remain open. The cloud finally passes over Area C, where no additional network protectors
operate. However, Figure 8.3 shows that low voltage will be present in the network based on the
amount of transformers that are now disconnected at the time.
Through these simulations, we observed that the effect of the presence of clouds is directly
proportional to the amount of PV penetration present in the grid network. For example, we see
that the voltage of the grid network is impacted as a result of clouds more heavily when the PV
penetration is high.
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CHAPTER 9. CASE STUDIES
9.1 Simulations with Faults on Feeder Networks
In this section, simulations are performed on the downtown network to investigate
network protector operation under faulted conditions, as well as the operation after a fault.
These simulations are performed under minimum load conditions where the load is 16% of the
peak load conditions. The simulation is summarized below:
1. Load flow solved at 2%, 5%, and 8% PV penetration for all arrangements.
2. Three phase fault established on each primary feeder network
a. Observe additional network protector trips due to fault
b. Observe re-close conditions post fault
c. Observe network protectors in open state post fault (due to reverse power flows
and overloads)
d. Observe changes (open/closed) in network protectors as a result of fault
9.2 Simulations with No PV Penetration Present
The first simulation is performed during the evening with no PV penetration present within
the grid network. Initially, there are 6 transformers out of service. An additional transformer is
disconnected due to reverse power flow. So at this point we have 162 out of 169 transformers
connected to the grid network. Next, a three-phase high resistance (0.05 per unit) fault is
introduced in each of the primary feeders. Figure 9.1 shows the location of the fault on feeder
side of grid vault 2.

Network Protector Status

Feeder 1

NP out-of-service

6

NP Trips with no PV

1

NP in open state pre-fault

7

Additional NP trips due to fault

6

NP closed after fault

0

NP in open state post fault

13

NP in different state after fault

6

Figure 9.1—Simulation results for a fault on feeder network 1 (No PV Penetration)
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After the fault has cleared, the voltages on the primary side of the transformer are slightly
higher than the voltage on the secondary side. The primary voltage angle also leads the voltage
angle on the secondary side. However, due to the small voltage difference between the primary
and secondary networks (Vd=0.39V), no network protectors reclosed after the fault.
This same simulation is repeated for each feeder network below in Figures 9.2 through 9.7.

Network Protector Status

Feeder 2

NP out-of-service

6

NP Trips with no PV

1

NP in open state pre-fault

7

Additional NP trips due to fault

6

NP closed after fault

0

NP in open state post fault

13

NP in different state after fault

6

Figure 9.2—Simulation results for a fault on feeder network 2 (No PV Penetration)

Network Protector Status

Feeder 3

NP out-of-service

6

NP Trips with no PV

1

NP in open state pre-fault

7

Additional NP trips due to fault

4

NP closed after fault

0

NP in open state post fault

11

NP in different state after fault

4

Figure 9.3—Simulation results for a fault on feeder network 3 (No PV Penetration)

36

Network Protector Status

Feeder 4

NP out-of-service

6

NP Trips with no PV

1

NP in open state pre-fault
Additional NP trips due to
fault

7

NP closed after fault

0

NP in open state post fault
NP in different state after
fault

11

4

4

Figure 9.4—Simulation results for a fault on feeder network 4 (No PV Penetration)

Network Protector Status

Feeder 5

NP out-of-service

6

NP Trips with no PV

1

NP in open state pre-fault

7

Additional NP trips due to fault

20

NP closed after fault

1

NP in open state post fault

26

NP in different state after fault

21

Figure 9.5—Simulation results for a fault on feeder network 5 (No PV Penetration)
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Network Protector Status Feeder 6
NP out-of-service

6

NP Trips with no PV
NP in open state pre-fault
Additional NP trips due to
fault

1
7

NP closed after fault
NP in open state post fault
NP in different state after
fault

13
1
19
14

Figure 9.6—Simulation results for a fault on feeder network 6 (No PV Penetration)

Network Protector Status

Feeder 7

NP out-of-service

6

NP Trips with no PV

1

NP in open state pre-fault
Additional NP trips due to
fault

7

NP closed after fault

0

NP in open state post fault
NP in different state after
fault

8

1

1

Figure 9.7—Simulation results for a fault on feeder network 7 (No PV Penetration)
9.3 Simulations with 2% PV Penetration Present
In this section, a three phase high impedance fault is introduced into all feeder networks
with 2% PV penetration present in the grid. For arrangement 1in Table 9, 5.9% of the
transformers in the downtown network are disconnected prior to the fault. We observe that after
a fault in feeders 5 and 6 has been cleared, one network protector will reclose in both cases.
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Table 9—Arrangement 1 with 2% PV penetration
Simulation
Feeder 1 Feeder 2 Feeder 3 Feeder 4 Feeder 5 Feeder 6 Feeder 7
NP disconnected prior to simulation
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
NP Trips with no PV
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
NP trips with 2% PV
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
NP in open state pre-fault
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
Additional NP trips due to fault
8
6
4
5
20
16
2
NP closed after fault
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
NP in open state post fault
18
16
14
15
29
25
12
NP in different state post fault
8
6
4
5
21
17
2

For arrangement 2, five additional network protectors tripped to remove the reverse power
flows caused by the 2% PV penetration. At this stage, 7.1% of the transformers in the downtown
network were disconnected prior to the fault. After the fault is cleared, we observe that no
network protectors reclose.
Table 10—Arrangement 2 with 2% PV penetration
Simulation
Feeder 1 Feeder 2 Feeder 3 Feeder 4 Feeder 5 Feeder 6 Feeder 7
NP disconnected prior to simulation
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
NP Trips with no PV
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
NP trips with 2% PV
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
NP in open state pre-fault
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
Additional NP trips due to fault
7
6
5
17
19
16
2
NP closed after fault
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
NP in open state post fault
19
18
17
29
31
28
14
NP in different state post fault
7
6
5
17
19
16
2

For arrangement 3, three additional network protectors tripped to remove the reverse power
flows caused by the 2% PV penetration. At this stage, 5.9% of the transformers in the downtown
network were disconnected prior to the fault. After the fault is cleared, we observe that no
network protectors reclose.
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Table 11—Arrangement 3 with 2% PV penetration
Simulation
Feeder 1 Feeder 2 Feeder 3 Feeder 4 Feeder 5 Feeder 6 Feeder 7
NP disconnected prior to simulation
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
NP Trips with no PV
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
NP trips with 2% PV
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
NP in open state pre-fault
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
Additional NP trips due to fault
8
6
4
5
20
16
1
NP closed after fault
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
NP in open state post fault
18
16
14
15
30
26
11
NP in different state post fault
8
6
4
5
20
16
1

9.4 Simulations with 5% PV Penetration Present
In this section, a three phase high impedance fault is introduced into all feeder networks
with 5% PV penetration present in the grid. For arrangement 1, 19 additional network protectors
trip with after 5% PV penetration has been added to the grid network. At this stage, 15.4% of the
transformers in the downtown network were disconnected prior to the fault. After the fault is
cleared, we see that no network protectors reclose.

Table 12—Arrangement 1 with 5% PV penetration
Simulation
Feeder 1 Feeder 2 Feeder 3 Feeder 4 Feeder 5 Feeder 6 Feeder 7
NP disconnected prior to simulation
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
NP Trips with no PV
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
NP trips with 5% PV
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
NP in open state pre-fault
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
Additional NP trips due to fault
8
6
5
4
18
18
3
NP closed after fault
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
NP in open state post fault
34
32
31
30
44
44
29
NP in different state post fault
8
6
5
4
18
18
3

For arrangement 2, 22 additional network protectors tripped to remove the reverse power
flows caused by the 5% PV penetration. At this stage, 17.2% of the transformers in the
downtown network were disconnected prior to the fault. After the fault is cleared, we observe
that no network protectors reclose.

40

Table 13—Arrangement 2 with 5% PV penetration
Simulation

Feeder 1 Feeder 2 Feeder 3 Feeder 4 Feeder 5 Feeder 6 Feeder 7

NP disconnected prior to simulation

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

NP Trips with no PV

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

NP trips with 5% PV

22

22

22

22

22

22

22

NP in open state pre-fault

29

29

29

29

29

29

29

Additional NP trips due to fault

9

7

5

5

16

17

5

NP closed after fault

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

NP in open state post fault
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36

34

34

45

46

34

NP in different state post fault

9

7

5

5

16

17

5

For arrangement 3, 22 additional network protectors tripped to remove the reverse power
flows caused by the 5% PV penetration. At this stage, 17.2% of the transformers in the
downtown network were disconnected prior to the fault. After the fault is cleared, we observe
that no network protectors reclose.
Table 14—Arrangement 3 with 5% PV penetration
Simulation
Feeder 1 Feeder 2 Feeder 3 Feeder 4 Feeder 5 Feeder 6 Feeder 7
NP disconnected prior to simulation
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
NP Trips with no PV
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
NP trips with 5% PV
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
NP in open state pre-fault
29
29
29
29
29
29
29
Additional NP trips due to fault
5
6
5
4
18
16
2
NP closed after fault
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
NP in open state post fault
34
35
34
33
47
45
31
NP in different state post fault
5
6
5
4
18
16
2

9.5 Simulations with 8% PV Penetration Present
In this section, a three phase high impedance fault is introduced into all feeder networks
with 8% PV penetration present in the grid. For arrangement 1, 57 additional network protectors
trip with after 8% PV penetration has been added to the grid network. At this stage, 37.9% of the
transformers in the downtown network were disconnected prior to the fault. After the fault is
cleared, we see that no network protectors reclose.
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Table 15—Arrangement 1 with 8% PV penetration
Simulation
Feeder 1 Feeder 2 Feeder 3 Feeder 4 Feeder 5 Feeder 6 Feeder 7
NP disconnected prior to simulation
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
NP Trips with no PV
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
NP trips with 8% PV
57
57
57
57
57
57
57
NP in open state pre-fault
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
Additional NP trips due to fault
6
6
2
2
14
6
5
NP closed after fault
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
NP in open state post fault
70
70
66
66
78
70
69
NP in different state post fault
6
6
2
2
14
6
5

For arrangement 2, 56 additional network protectors tripped to remove the reverse power
flows caused by the 8% PV penetration. At this stage, 37.3% of the transformers in the
downtown network were disconnected prior to the fault. After the fault is cleared, we observe
that no network protectors reclose.
Table 16—Arrangement 2 with 8% PV penetration
Simulation
Feeder 1 Feeder 2 Feeder 3 Feeder 4 Feeder 5 Feeder 6 Feeder 7
NP disconnected prior to simulation
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
NP Trips with no PV
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
NP trips with 8% PV
56
56
56
56
56
56
56
NP in open state pre-fault
63
63
63
63
63
63
63
Additional NP trips due to fault
7
5
3
2
13
11
3
NP closed after fault
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
NP in open state post fault
70
68
66
65
76
74
66
NP in different state post fault
7
5
3
2
13
11
3

For arrangement 3, 57 additional network protectors tripped to remove the reverse power
flows caused by the 8% PV penetration. At this stage, 37.9% of the transformers in the
downtown network were disconnected prior to the fault. After the fault is cleared, we observe
that no network protectors reclose.
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Table 17—Arrangement 3 with 8% PV penetration
Simulation
Feeder 1 Feeder 2 Feeder 3 Feeder 4 Feeder 5 Feeder 6 Feeder 7
NP disconnected prior to simulation
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
NP Trips with no PV
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
NP trips with 8% PV
57
57
57
57
57
57
57
NP in open state pre-fault
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
Additional NP trips due to fault
3
5
2
4
16
14
5
NP closed after fault
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
NP in open state post fault
67
69
66
68
80
78
69
NP in different state post fault
3
5
2
4
16
14
5
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CHAPTER 10. RECLOSE VOLTAGE ANALYSIS
10.1 Closing Characteristic of Network Protector Relay
In this section, the reclosing voltage V D , which is the voltage difference between the two
sides of the network protector (i.e., transformer side voltage and network side voltage,) is
observed. The closing characteristic of the network protector relay is shown in Figure 10.1
below.

Figure 10.1—Closing characteristic of the network protector relay [10]
The symbols used in Figure 10.1 are summarized below:
VD = VT – VN

(22)

VT = transformer side voltage

(23)

VN = network side voltage

(24)

VD = difference voltage

(25)

Due to the existence of the fault current, the voltage difference in the case of fault is different
from when the fault has been cleared. The reclosing action takes place only when the voltage on
the transformer side of the open network protector is slightly higher in magnitude and is in phase
with or leading the voltage on the network side of the protector. The reclosing action is
accomplished primarily with two settings on the Richards network protector provided by
Entergy:


Reclose Volts: Minimum three phase average differential voltage necessary to close
the protector.



Reclose Angle: The protector will not close if the angle between the network voltage
and differential voltage is below this setting.
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The default setting for the reclose voltage is set at 1.4V with an adjustable range of 0.1 to
10.0 Volts. In other words the protector will not close unless the voltage of the transformer side
of the open network protector is at least 1.4V greater than the voltage on the network side of the
protector. The default setting for the reclose angle is set at -5 degrees with an adjustable range of
-25 to +5 degrees.

10.2 Reclose Settings Analysis
We can look at the reclose analysis of the network protector relay by revisiting the fault
analysis covered in Section 8.5 of this paper:
If we look at arrangement 1 with 8% PV penetration present in the grid network we recall
that 64 out of the 169 transformers are disconnected prior to the fault. In our simulations, the
reclose voltage is set at 2V. However, if we use the default reclose voltage setting of the relay
the voltage difference, VD, before a fault on feeder 5 has cleared will be seen in Figure 10.2.

Figure 10.2—VD before a fault has cleared on feeder 5
With the reclose voltage set at 1.4 Volts, two network protectors will reclose after the
fault has cleared. At GV29_Fdr4, the voltage difference, VD = 1.87V > 1.4V; and at
GV44_Fdr7, VD = 1.62V > 1.4V. However, after the fault has cleared both transformers will
see reverse power and trip again. After a 6 cycle time delay, both transformers will reclose.
This process will continue leading to excessive relay operations, known as pumping. The
reclose voltage setting establishes the minimum difference voltage magnitude required to
issue a close command when the difference voltage and network voltage are in phase [10].
Allowing the network protector to close with a small difference voltage magnitude can lead
to pumping. To resolve this issue, minimum reclose voltage was changed to 2V throughout
simulations.
To illustrate the reclose analysis with the reclose voltage set at 2V, we will revisit the
fault analysis of arrangement 1 with 2% PV penetration. In this simulation 20 network
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protectors were disconnected prior to the fault on feeder 5. When a fault occurs on feeder 5
no network protectors reclose, and the voltage difference for the relays resemble Figure 10.3.

Figure 10.3—VD before a fault has cleared on feeder 5
After the fault has cleared, we see that one network protector recloses and stays closed.
Figure 10.4 shows plots of the voltage difference after the fault has cleared. Increasing the
reclose voltage setting to 2V eliminated the excessive breaker operations that were present when
this setting was set at the default setting of 1.4V. We only observed this issue of “pumping” in
the presence of distributed generation in the secondary grid network.

Figure 10.4—VD after a fault has cleared on feeder 5
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CHAPTER 11. PV PENETRATION LIMITS
At this stage, it is very difficult to determine a safe minimum amount of generation on the
Downtown Network Electrical Distribution system with our current knowledge of the downtown
network. Network protectors operate very rapidly. Under minimum customer electrical usage
conditions and when faults occur, network protectors could operate and the local distribution
system could become unstable. In addition, tripping the network protectors could cause the
secondary cable system to overload. Since reliability of electrical service is paramount, more
work and study towards investigation of the downtown network under these incidents are
required before allowing customer electrical generation to be connected.
To examine the acceptable PV penetration limits on the grid network, we studied the grid
network under minimum loading conditions. This gives us a worst case scenario where the
generation within the grid network exceeds the load demand much sooner in simulations. In
these simulations the sensitive trip setting is set to trip when 1.5% of rated current flows from the
grid network to the feeder network. No communications between network protectors were
present during the simulation. The reclose operation of the protector was disabled throughout
the simulations. In addition to the network protector protection, the transformer will disconnect
overloads at 100% of rated loads.

11.1 Simulations with 8% PV Penetration Present
The effect of the network protectors under minimum loading conditions with 8% PV
penetration is outlined below:




6 out of 169 transformers out of service prior to simulations
1 additional transformer is disconnected due to reverse power flow with no PV
penetration
8% PV penetration inserted into grid network
o 33 transformers initially trip due to reverse power flow
o After 6 cycles, 10 transformers trip due to reverse power flow
o After another 6 cycles, 6 transformers trip due to reverse power flow
o After another 6 cycles, 4 transformers trip due to reverse power flow
o 1 transformer becomes overloaded, and is disconnected from the grid network
o After another 6 cycles, 1 transformers trip due to reverse power flow
o 62 out of 169 transformers are disconnected (37% removed)

Since this project only concentrates on the network protector operation, we suggest that another
investigation be carried out to observe the downtown network load-flow and transients under
different PV penetration levels and when network protectors operate.
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CHAPTER 12. PROPOSED SOLUTION
The experimental results obtained above clarifies that the network protector can sense some
reverse power flow when distributed solar generation exists in the secondary network even when
there is no fault in the primary feeder. This situation can cause the network protectors to falsely
trip due to distributed generation from the secondary grid. Hence, this section is dedicated to
proposing a solution that could potentially prevent the erroneous tripping of network protectors
because of the reverse current produced by the presence of PV penetration within the grid
network.
The proposed method requires obtaining all currents, injected and absorbed, by the network
protectors and loads on the feeder. This requires a data acquisition system using hard-wire
connections or a data transmission infrastructure. The measured currents provide a signal that
can override the trip command of all the network protectors inside the feeder. For proper
operation, the proposed method must be applied to all the individual feeders, simultaneously.
The following algorithm can be used to detect faults located in the primary feeder network
and trip the network protector to isolate the fault. For reverse current flow as a result of excess
PV penetration, the network protector will still sense the reverse power; however, a block
command will prevent the protector from tripping.
o For each feeder network, N (where N = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7), measure the current flow at the
origination point at the substation using current transformers.
o IN = current originating from substation in feeder network N
o When IN > 0 current is flowing from the main substation towards the
feeder network.
o When IN < 0 current is flowing from the feeder network towards the main
substation. This happens at high levels of PV penetration within the
secondary grid network, where the excess power will flow back to the
main transformer. A fault on the main substation transformer can also
cause power to flow to the main substation.
o Using current transformers, measure the current associated with feeder network N at each
spot and grid vault.
o Igrid_n = current at GV_0n
o Ispot_n = current at SV_0n
o In unfaulted case:
o IN = ∑ (Igrid_n + Ispot_n)
o For a fault in feeder network N:
o IN ≠ ∑ (Igrid_n + Ispot_n)
o This feature will override a trip condition on the network protector
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o If the NP senses reverse power flow AND IN ≠ ∑ (Igrid_n + Ispot_n) the network
protector will issue a trip command. Otherwise reverse power flow is due to PV
penetration and no trip command is issued.

Figure 12.1—Logic diagram of fault detection system
Figure 12.1 is a simple logic diagram for the proposed solution. The network protector will
only trip if the network protector relay senses reverse power flow above the sensitive trip setting
and if the real power flows originating from the main substation in feeder network N does not
equal the real power flows associated with feeder network N at each spot and grid vault. The
network protector also has a time delay set at a speed slower than the speed of the central control
system. This allows the central control system time to process the algorithm and determine if the
power flow in the feeder network N sums to zero. This scheme also requires communication
between each network protector and the central control system.
12.1 Feeder 1 Simulations with 5% PV Penetration
To demonstrate the algorithm we will look at the feeder network 1 in Figure 12.2. Current
transformers are shown on the 13.2KV primary side of the spot and grid vaults, as well as on the
13.2KV feeder breaker. These currents are combined together to detect faults on the 13.2KV
feeder network. In this simulation, 5% PV penetration under minimum loads (16% of peak load)
is present. With 5% PV penetration present within the grid network, 12 transformers will sense
real power flowing from the secondary network to the feeder network.
After running the load flow simulation with these conditions, we observed that one of the
network protectors from feeder network 1 will sense reverse power flow. However, the sum of
the currents flowing in feeder network 1 approximates to zero which indicates that there is no
fault in the feeder network. Therefore, we do not want any network protectors to trip for this
condition. The central control system will calculate the following parameters from the current
and voltage transformers connected to each of the vaults. These calculations shown are the per
unit values in rectangular form.
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o I1 = 0.5062262 – j1.7302874
o ∑ Igrid_n = 0.1911643 – j0.8945817
o ∑ Ispot_n = 0.3150619 – j0.8357057
o ∑ Igrid_n + ∑ Ispot_n = 0.5062225 – j1.730286
The power flows within feeder network 1 with 5% PV penetration are also shown below.
o P1 = 515.39 kW
o ∑ Pgrid_n = 198.67 kW
o ∑ Pspot_n = 316.09 kW
o ∑ Pgrid_n + ∑ Pspot_n = 514.76 kW
The positive real part of I1 indicates that current flows from the main substation towards
the feeder 1 network. The summation of the current contributions from the grid and spot vault
only differs slightly from the main current, I1, which can be attributed to the line losses in the
distribution lines. Based on these calculations, the central control system will send a block
signal to the associated network protector relays, preventing these relays from tripping.
12.1.1 5% PV Penetration without Fault

Figure 12.2—Feeder network 1 without fault (5% PV penetration)
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12.1.2 5% PV Penetration with Fault
The case for the fault on feeder network 1 is shown in Figure 12.3. A three phase fault
occurs on feeder network 1. For this case, 8 network protectors in feeder network 1 will sense
the reverse power flowing from the grid network to the feeder network. In this case, we want the
network protectors to trip in order to isolate the fault on the feeder network. The central control
system detects this as a fault using the calculations below:
o I1 = 19.6404299 – j1.4770175
o ∑ Igrid_n = -0.1810792 – j0.6645902
o ∑ Ispot_n = -0.0226011 – j0.6298474
o ∑ Igrid_n + ∑ Ispot_n = -0.2036804 – j1.2944375
The power flows within feeder network 1 with 5% PV penetration and a fault present in the
primary feeder network are also shown below.
o P1 = 19,640 kW = 19.64 MW
o ∑ Pgrid_n = -179.68 kW
o ∑ Pspot_n = -21.55 kW
o ∑ Pgrid_n + ∑ Pspot_n = -201.22 kW
We see that there is a large mismatch between the current flowing from feeder 1 (I1) of
the main substation and the current flowing through the vaults (Igrid and Ispot) that are connected
to the feeder 1 network. Additionally, the current flowing from the main transformer is of a
much higher magnitude than normal which indicates that this is possibly a large source of fault
current to the fault on feeder 1. This fault also causes a number of network protectors to sense
the reverse current. As a result, all 8 network protectors will trip to isolate this fault on the
faulted feeder. Figure 12.3 also shows the network protectors which will trip due to the fault
condition within feeder network 1. The arrows indicate the direction of current flow measured at
the main substation feeder, as well as at each of the grid and spot vaults in the network using
current transformers. In Figure 12.3 current flows from the main substation feeder to the
primary feeder. In the case of the grid and spot vaults, the currents flowing towards the primary
feeder network will result in network protector relay operations.
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Figure 12.3—Feeder network 1 with fault (5% PV penetration)
Based on Figure 12.3, we see that the network protectors at the following locations will issue a
trip:


GV_01



SV_01



GV_02



SV_02



GV_03



GV_04



GV_05



GV_20
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Table 18 shows the current values (in per unit) which were used to calculate the parameters for
the fault detection scheme. Reverse power flows at each network transformer are highlighted.
Table 18—Current calculations for simulation with 5% PV penetration
From Node

To Node

Current (pu) without fault

Current (pu) with fault

Main substation

Fdr_1

0.506-1.73i

19.64-1.477i

F1_Node006

SV01_Fdr1

-0.001-0.005i

-0.089+0.058i

F1_Node008

GV02_Fdr1

0.015-0.046i

-0.126+0.064i

F1_Node010

SV02_Fdr1

0.071-0.185i

-0.116-0.059i

F1_Node012

GV03_Fdr1

0.014-0.07i

-0.089-0.005i

F1_Node013

GV01_Fdr1

0.007-0.101i

-0.048-0.064i

F1_Node017

GV04_Fdr1

0.007-0.129i

-0.006-0.124i

F1_Node019

GV05_Fdr1

0.008-0.032i

-0.005-0.027i

F1_Node022

GV06_Fdr1

0.01-0.034i

-0.03i

F1_Node027

GV07_Fdr1

0.01-0.023i

0.009-0.023i

F1_Node028

SV03_Fdr1

0.02-0.07i

0.015-0.069i

F1_Node030

SV04_Fdr1

0.046-0.112i

0.039-0.11i

F1_Node033

GV08_Fdr1

0

0

F1_Node034

GV09_Fdr1

0

0

F1_Node035

GV10_Fdr1

0.048-0.156i

0.047-0.156i

F1_Node038

SV05_Fdr1

0.028-0.086i

0.015-0.082i

F1_Node041

SV06_Fdr1

0.051-0.106i

0.042-0.103i

F1_Node042

SV07_Fdr1

0.051-0.13i

0.04-0.127i

F1_Node045

GV11_Fdr1

0.008-0.06i

0.006-0.06i

F1_Node046

GV20_Fdr1

-0.011i

-0.004-0.012i

F1_Node050

GV12_Fdr1

0.009-0.02i

0.002-0.018i

F1_Node053

GV49_Fdr1

0.033-0.143i

0.021-0.14i

F1_Node055

SV10_Fdr1

0.024-0.081i

0.016-0.079i

F1_Node057

SV11_Fdr1

0.024-0.061i

0.016-0.059i

F1_Node058

GV13_Fdr1

0.021-0.07i

0.014-0.068i

0.506-1.73i

-0.204-1.294i

Current from vaults

At 5% PV penetration with a fault in feeder network 1, we see that 8 network protector relays
will trip to isolate the fault in the primary feeder network. Only1 additional network protector
relay sensed reverse power flow from the secondary network for the case without a fault.
However the current contribution from the main substation feeder was equal to the sum of
currents at the spot and grid vaults, which indicated there was no fault and consequently, no
voltage drop in the primary feeder network. Table 19 shows the power flows for the same case.
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Table 19—Power flows for simulation with 5% PV penetration
From Node

To Node

Real power flow (kW) without fault

Real power flow (kW) with fault

Main substation

Fdr_1

515.39

19,640.43

F1_Node006

SV01_Fdr1

-1.2600797857

-88.9003490922

F1_Node008

GV02_Fdr1

15.0501748693

-125.8703204335

F1_Node010

SV02_Fdr1

71.2778595240

-115.2393951813

F1_Node012

GV03_Fdr1

14.5700433683

-88.8020109445

F1_Node013

GV01_Fdr1

7.7923436445

-47.9385751271

F1_Node017

GV04_Fdr1

14.6235395479

-5.8822720928

F1_Node019

GV05_Fdr1

10.4061499329

-5.2294614834

F1_Node022

GV06_Fdr1

11.5638748319

0.0375443052

F1_Node027

GV07_Fdr1

9.9435702518

9.0687880765

F1_Node028

SV03_Fdr1

22.3063661387

14.8842323241

F1_Node030

SV04_Fdr1

46.6977834905

39.3862514709

F1_Node033

GV08_Fdr1

-5.4190367188

0.0000000013

F1_Node034

GV09_Fdr1

-2.8531317101

0.0000000052

F1_Node035

GV10_Fdr1

48.5781766184

46.7641366931

F1_Node038

SV05_Fdr1

28.8400223259

14.8059854823

F1_Node041

SV06_Fdr1

50.3437249547

41.8543417745

F1_Node042

SV07_Fdr1

52.8208358439

40.2843884261

F1_Node045

GV11_Fdr1

8.4453844450

5.7119788200

F1_Node046

GV20_Fdr1

1.3000516839

-4.3980195567

F1_Node050

GV12_Fdr1

7.5915989686

2.1156244272

F1_Node053

GV49_Fdr1

35.8412507757

20.7304434839

F1_Node055

SV10_Fdr1

23.8714906139

15.5002465854

F1_Node057

SV11_Fdr1

21.1941836088

15.8780413085

F1_Node058

GV13_Fdr1

21.2316173169

14.0136205886

514.7577945409

-201.2247801387

Power flow from vaults

12.1.3 30% PV Penetration without Fault
Next, we simulate a condition without a fault on feeder network 1 with 30% PV
penetration present under minimum loads. Figure 12.4 shows the direction of real power flow in
the feeder network under these conditions. At 30% PV penetration we see reverse power flow at
the main substation feeder. This is expected as the excess renewable energy is now fed back
towards the main substation. This excess energy, however, can provide power for other feeder
networks.

54

Figure 12.4—Feeder network 1 without fault (30% PV)

The central control system will calculate the following parameters from the current and voltage
transformers connected to each of the vaults:
o I1 = -0.6297444 – j1.7620101
o ∑ Igrid_n = -0.8492566 – j0.9672971
o ∑ Ispot_n = 0.2195132 – j0.7947125
o ∑ Igrid_n + ∑ Ispot_n = -0.6297434 – j1.7620096
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o P1 = -629.75 kW
o ∑ Pgrid_n = -849.36 kW
o ∑ Pspot_n = 218.96 kW
o ∑ Pgrid_n + ∑ Pspot_n = -630.4 kW
For this calculation, all currents within the network did sum to zero. Therefore, the
central control system will issue a block trip to all 16 network protectors associated with the
feeder 1 network. This will allow the distributed generation (at 30% of peak load) from the
secondary network to safely transmit power to the utility grid.

12.1.4 30% PV Penetration with Fault
The case for the fault on feeder network 1 with 30% PV penetration is shown in Figure 12.5.
A three phase fault occurs on feeder network 1 as shown in Figure 12.5. For this case, 18
network protectors in feeder network 1 will sense the reverse power flowing from the grid
network to the feeder network. In this case, we want the network protectors to trip in order to
isolate the fault on the feeder network. The central control system detects this as a fault using
the calculations below:
o I1 = 18.4853699 – j1.5018959
o ∑ Igrid_n = -1.2434276 – j0.7313455
o ∑ Ispot_n = -0.1167292 – j0.5898624
o ∑ Igrid_n + ∑ Ispot_n = -1.3601568 - j1.3212079
o P1 = 18,485 kW
o ∑ Pgrid_n = -1,240 kW
o ∑ Pspot_n = -115.85 kW
o ∑ Pgrid_n + ∑ Pspot_n = -1,357 kW
For the case with the fault on feeder 1, the sum of currents in feeder 1 network did not sum to
zero. Therefore, we know that a true fault exists on the feeder 1 network and the central control
system will allow these 18 network protectors to trip to isolate the fault.
Table 20 shows the current values (in per unit) which were used to calculate the parameters
for the fault detection scheme. Reverse power flows at each network transformer are highlighted
to indicate which network protectors will trip under these conditions.
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Figure 12.5—Feeder network 1 with fault (30% PV)
We see the 16 network protectors which will sense reverse power from the secondary
network. However, for the case without the fault in the primary feeder network 1 the current
contribution from the main substation feeder equals the sum of all of the currents in the grid and
spot vaults. This indicates that the current that enters the primary feeder network will also exit
the primary feeder network, with the exception of line losses. There are no loads located within
the primary feeder network, so we would only expect small amounts of voltage drops in the
distribution lines. Therefore, for this case the central control system issues a block signal to all
16 network protectors to prevent any operations.
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Table 20—Current calculations for simulation with 30% PV penetration
From Node

To Node

Current (pu) without fault

Current (pu) with fault

Main substation

Fdr_1

-0.63-1.762i

18.485-1.502i

F1_Node006

SV01_Fdr1

-0.006-0.003i

-0.095+0.06i

F1_Node008

GV02_Fdr1

-0.021-0.049i

-0.162+0.062i

F1_Node010

SV02_Fdr1

0.058-0.178i

-0.13-0.052i

F1_Node012

GV03_Fdr1

-0.038-0.067i

-0.141-0.001i

F1_Node013

GV01_Fdr1

-0.157-0.092i

-0.213-0.055i

F1_Node017

GV04_Fdr1

-0.107-0.098i

-0.123-0.092i

F1_Node019

GV05_Fdr1

-0.011-0.029i

-0.025-0.024i

F1_Node022

GV06_Fdr1

-0.031-0.037i

-0.041-0.034i

F1_Node027

GV07_Fdr1

0.003-0.023i

0.002-0.023i

F1_Node028

SV03_Fdr1

0.017-0.064i

0.011-0.063i

F1_Node030

SV04_Fdr1

0.04-0.11i

0.033-0.108i

F1_Node033

GV08_Fdr1

-0.098-0.03i

-0.105-0.028i

F1_Node034

GV09_Fdr1

-0.196-0.108i

-0.208-0.105i

F1_Node035

GV10_Fdr1

-0.062-0.159i

-0.064-0.16i

F1_Node038

SV05_Fdr1

0.012-0.08i

-0.001-0.075i

F1_Node041

SV06_Fdr1

0.048-0.108i

0.039-0.105i

F1_Node042

SV07_Fdr1

0.046-0.124i

0.035-0.121i

F1_Node045

GV11_Fdr1

-0.094-0.063i

-0.097-0.063i

F1_Node046

GV20_Fdr1

-0.01-0.009i

-0.014-0.01i

F1_Node050

GV12_Fdr1

-0.009-0.022i

-0.016-0.02i

F1_Node053

GV49_Fdr1

-0.006-0.114i

-0.017-0.111i

F1_Node055

SV10_Fdr1

-0.002-0.074i

-0.01-0.072i

F1_Node057

SV11_Fdr1

0.008-0.054i

-0.053i

F1_Node058

GV13_Fdr1

-0.012-0.068i

-0.019-0.066i

-0.622-1.76i

-1.361-1.319i

Current from vaults

We see a similar amount of network protectors which will sense reverse power flows in
the case of a fault in feeder network 1. However, the algorithm developed clearly shows a
mismatch between the power flow that enters and exits the primary feeder network. In this case,
the central control system will allow all 18 network protectors relays to operate to isolate the
fault. Table 21 shows the power flows which can be calculated using current transformers for
the current readings, and potential transformers for the voltages.
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Table 21—Power flows for simulation with 30% PV penetration
From Node

To Node

Real power flow (kW) without fault

Real power flow (kW) with fault

Main substation

Fdr_1

-629.75

18,485.37

F1_Node006

SV01_Fdr1

-6.23609948

-94.4794342

F1_Node008

GV02_Fdr1

-21.12221481

-161.6464914

F1_Node010

SV02_Fdr1

57.48784276

-128.7126627

F1_Node012

GV03_Fdr1

-38.44512417

-140.7156843

F1_Node013

GV01_Fdr1

-157.2290522

-212.4579764

F1_Node017

GV04_Fdr1

-106.7929891

-122.6756897

F1_Node019

GV05_Fdr1

-11.23322198

-25.19059554

F1_Node022

GV06_Fdr1

-30.97934784

-40.74889626

F1_Node027

GV07_Fdr1

2.867885958

2.066855909

F1_Node028

SV03_Fdr1

16.45468298

11.13455224

F1_Node030

SV04_Fdr1

39.52575411

33.18110094

F1_Node033

GV08_Fdr1

-97.47851483

-104.5261543

F1_Node034

GV09_Fdr1

-196.1349424

-208.2583669

F1_Node035

GV10_Fdr1

-62.45680283

-64.05582001

F1_Node038

SV05_Fdr1

12.35527969

-0.758611033

F1_Node041

SV06_Fdr1

47.48546292

38.5209141

F1_Node042

SV07_Fdr1

45.83909505

34.99907356

F1_Node045

GV11_Fdr1

-93.97877251

-96.56936756

F1_Node046

GV20_Fdr1

-9.694551948

-14.24267043

F1_Node050

GV12_Fdr1

-9.279195074

-15.5579937

F1_Node053

GV49_Fdr1

-5.592892092

-17.39857721

F1_Node055

SV10_Fdr1

-2.090952318

-9.987280658

F1_Node057

SV11_Fdr1

8.137355686

0.250251732

F1_Node058

GV13_Fdr1

-11.81224456

-18.8049518

-630.403559

-1356.634476

Power flow from vaults

Without the fault detection scheme in use with 16% loading and 30% PV penetration, the
following scenario would have occurred:


6 transformers are out of service on this day.



An additional network protector trips due to reverse power flow with no PV penetration
in grid network.



30% PV penetration is inserted in grid network



79 network protector relays trip due to reverse power flow.



After 6 cycles, 24 additional network protectors trip.
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At this point, the voltage collapses due to the amount of transformers disconnected from
the downtown network (110/169 disconnected).



Only 35% of transformers in service.

Therefore, the fault detection scheme solves the problem of distinguishing PV penetration
from a faulted condition by tripping the relay for fault conditions and preventing the relays from
tripping for the case of PV penetration. This solution also allows a higher amount of PV
penetration to be present within the secondary grid network without causing a voltage collapse or
unstable condition on the power system. Due to the symmetrical rating of distribution
transformers, we also know that the thermal limit of the transformer does not vary depending on
the direction of power flow [8]. Appendix A provides calculations for a fault in feeder network 1
with 60% and 90% PV penetration. Additionally, simulation results for faults on the other feeder
networks for 30% PV penetration are provided in Appendix B.
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CHAPTER 13. CONCLUSION
This project has investigated some of the problems and challenges posed by the potential
addition of renewable energy sources present in downtown networks. Actual data was gathered
and used to model these renewable energy sources. With these models, we were able to study
the effect of higher distributed generation levels in downtown networks under various loading
conditions. As expected, we have shown that our load demand in the downtown network
decreases with increased PV penetration. We have also studied the effect of network protectors
on the downtown network as PV penetration is increased within the grid network. The effect of
clouds passing over the downtown network was also studied. It has been shown that the
presence of clouds will negatively affect the stability of networks which depend largely on
distributed generation for energy. The operation of the network protector relay after a fault
condition has cleared was also examined. We were able to eliminate excessive breaker
operations by increasing the reclose voltage setting on the network protector relay. Various
simulations were conducted to examine the operation of the network protectors when the primary
feeder network was subjected to faults. Using the results from these simulations, we were
ultimately able to propose a solution that will only trip the network protectors for faults within
the primary feeder network. Potential future studies involve investigating the downtown
distribution network under more scenarios to determine a safe level of PV penetration. Other
future work includes implementing the proposed solution via communication among network
protector relays in a test network.
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APPENDIX A – CASE STUDIES FOR 60% AND 90% PV PENETRATION
A1. Calculations with 60% PV Penetration
A1.1 60% PV Penetration without Fault
o I1 = -1.9561132 - j1.9128399
o ∑ Igrid_n = -2.0592297-j1.1482305
o ∑ Ispot_n = 0.1031161-j0.7646077
o ∑ Igrid_n + ∑ Ispot_n = -1.9561136-j1.9128382
o P1 = -1,956.11 kW
o ∑ Pgrid_n = -2,059.74 kW
o ∑ Pspot_n = 102.31.96 kW
o ∑ Pgrid_n + ∑ Pspot_n = -1,957.43 kW

A1.2 60% PV Penetration with Fault
o I1 = 17.1599451 - j1.6498785
o ∑ Igrid_n = -2.4538551-j0.9117961
o ∑ Ispot_n = -0.2331864-j0.5597579
o ∑ Igrid_n + ∑ Ispot_n = -2.6870416-j1.4715539
o P1 = -17,159.95 kW
o ∑ Pgrid_n = -2,450.15 kW
o ∑ Pspot_n = 232.50 kW
o ∑ Pgrid_n + ∑ Pspot_n = -1,356.63 kW
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Table A.1—Current calculations for simulation with 60% PV penetration
From Node

To Node

Current (pu) without fault

Current (pu) with fault

Main substation

Fdr_1

-1.956-1.913i

17.16-1.65i

F1_Node006

SV01_Fdr1

-0.012-0.001i

-0.101+0.062i

F1_Node008

GV02_Fdr1

-0.064-0.055i

-0.205+0.055i

F1_Node010

SV02_Fdr1

0.041-0.173i

-0.146-0.047i

F1_Node012

GV03_Fdr1

-0.101-0.07i

-0.204-0.005i

F1_Node013

GV01_Fdr1

-0.354-0.093i

-0.41-0.055i

F1_Node017

GV04_Fdr1

-0.25-0.119i

-0.266-0.113i

F1_Node019

GV05_Fdr1

-0.036-0.035i

-0.05-0.03i

F1_Node022

GV06_Fdr1

-0.079-0.049i

-0.089-0.046i

F1_Node027

GV07_Fdr1

-0.005-0.025i

-0.006-0.026i

F1_Node028

SV03_Fdr1

0.01-0.062i

0.004-0.061i

F1_Node030

SV04_Fdr1

0.031-0.109i

0.025-0.107i

F1_Node033

GV08_Fdr1

-0.203-0.044i

-0.211-0.042i

F1_Node034

GV09_Fdr1

-0.406-0.19i

-0.418-0.187i

F1_Node035

GV10_Fdr1

-0.191-0.175i

-0.193-0.176i

F1_Node038

SV05_Fdr1

-0.007-0.075i

-0.02-0.071i

F1_Node041

SV06_Fdr1

0.044-0.108i

0.035-0.105i

F1_Node042

SV07_Fdr1

0.038-0.122i

0.027-0.118i

F1_Node045

GV11_Fdr1

-0.214-0.075i

-0.216-0.076i

F1_Node046

GV20_Fdr1

-0.023-0.01i

-0.027-0.011i

F1_Node050

GV12_Fdr1

-0.029-0.023i

-0.035-0.022i

F1_Node053

GV49_Fdr1

-0.054-0.114i

-0.066-0.112i

F1_Node055

SV10_Fdr1

-0.033-0.07i

-0.041-0.068i

F1_Node057

SV11_Fdr1

-0.008-0.045i

-0.016-0.044i

F1_Node058

GV13_Fdr1

-0.051-0.068i

-0.058-0.067i

-1.956-1.913i

-2.687-1.472i

Current from vaults
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Table A.2—Power flows for simulation with 60% PV penetration
From Node

To Node

Real power flow (kW) without fault

Real power flow (kW) with fault

Main substation

Fdr_1

-1956.11

17,159.95

F1_Node006

SV01_Fdr1

-12.2931563

-100.5354233

F1_Node008

GV02_Fdr1

-63.52609367

-203.7262137

F1_Node010

SV02_Fdr1

40.83469625

-145.3485241

F1_Node012

GV03_Fdr1

-100.6597467

-202.6535271

F1_Node013

GV01_Fdr1

-353.5906447

-408.5199946

F1_Node017

GV04_Fdr1

-250.2663023

-266.1251064

F1_Node019

GV05_Fdr1

-36.16357632

-50.11910875

F1_Node022

GV06_Fdr1

-79.3705088

-89.13195008

F1_Node027

GV07_Fdr1

-5.170074807

-5.969628139

F1_Node028

SV03_Fdr1

9.430122019

4.107769699

F1_Node030

SV04_Fdr1

31.1155033

24.77053653

F1_Node033

GV08_Fdr1

-203.4210756

-210.4550981

F1_Node034

GV09_Fdr1

-406.2809647

-418.3581847

F1_Node035

GV10_Fdr1

-191.3193559

-192.8985648

F1_Node038

SV05_Fdr1

-7.369531616

-20.48501954

F1_Node041

SV06_Fdr1

44.15261578

35.18718836

F1_Node042

SV07_Fdr1

37.43325755

26.59135832

F1_Node045

GV11_Fdr1

-213.7724107

-216.3592107

F1_Node046

GV20_Fdr1

-22.50455267

-27.05623718

F1_Node050

GV12_Fdr1

-29.00505017

-35.28450435

F1_Node053

GV49_Fdr1

-54.03014731

-65.83461504

F1_Node055

SV10_Fdr1

-32.95988777

-40.85739931

F1_Node057

SV11_Fdr1

-8.034370768

-15.92610799

F1_Node058

GV13_Fdr1

-50.65982542

-57.65326605

-1957.431081

-1356.634476

Power flow from vaults (kW)
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A2. Calculations with 90% PV Penetration

A2.1 90% PV Penetration without Fault
o I1 = -3.2313851 - j2.2010854
o ∑ Igrid_n = -3.2179942-j1.4554658
o ∑ Ispot_n = -0.0133911-j0.7456192
o ∑ Igrid_n + ∑ Ispot_n = -3.2313854-j2.2010851
o P1 = -3,231.39 kW
o ∑ Pgrid_n = -3,219.52 kW
o ∑ Pspot_n = 14.49 kW
o ∑ Pgrid_n + ∑ Pspot_n = -3234.00 kW

A2.2 90% PV Penetration without Fault
o I1 = 15.8854247 - j1.9354059
o ∑ Igrid_n = -3.6130806 - j1.2187094
o ∑ Ispot_n = -0.3497503-j0.5407927
o ∑ Igrid_n + ∑ Ispot_n = -3.9628309-j1.7595021
o P1 = -1,5885.42 kW
o ∑ Pgrid_n = -3,608.79 kW
o ∑ Pspot_n = 349.25 kW
o ∑ Pgrid_n + ∑ Pspot_n = -1,356.63 kW
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Table A.3—Current calculations for simulation with 90% PV penetration
From Node

To Node

Current (pu) without fault

Current (pu) with fault

Main substation

Fdr_1

-3.231-2.201i

15.885-1.935i

F1_Node006

SV01_Fdr1

-0.018

-0.107+0.064i

F1_Node008

GV02_Fdr1

-0.105-0.064i

-0.246+0.046i

F1_Node010

SV02_Fdr1

0.024-0.17i

-0.163-0.044i

F1_Node012

GV03_Fdr1

-0.161-0.079i

-0.264-0.013i

F1_Node013

GV01_Fdr1

-0.548-0.1i

-0.605-0.062i

F1_Node017

GV04_Fdr1

-0.391-0.145i

-0.407-0.14i

F1_Node019

GV05_Fdr1

-0.06-0.043i

-0.074-0.039i

F1_Node022

GV06_Fdr1

-0.125-0.067i

-0.135-0.063i

F1_Node027

GV07_Fdr1

-0.013-0.028i

-0.014-0.029i

F1_Node028

SV03_Fdr1

0.003-0.06i

-0.003-0.059i

F1_Node030

SV04_Fdr1

0.023-0.108i

0.017-0.106i

F1_Node033

GV08_Fdr1

-0.305-0.07i

-0.312-0.068i

F1_Node034

GV09_Fdr1

-0.591-0.33i

-0.603-0.327i

F1_Node035

GV10_Fdr1

-0.316-0.202i

-0.317-0.202i

F1_Node038

SV05_Fdr1

-0.027-0.073i

-0.04-0.069i

F1_Node041

SV06_Fdr1

0.041-0.109i

0.032-0.106i

F1_Node042

SV07_Fdr1

0.029-0.12i

0.018-0.117i

F1_Node045

GV11_Fdr1

-0.33-0.096i

-0.333-0.096i

F1_Node046

GV20_Fdr1

-0.035-0.013i

-0.039-0.014i

F1_Node050

GV12_Fdr1

-0.048-0.027i

-0.054-0.025i

F1_Node053

GV49_Fdr1

-0.101-0.12i

-0.113-0.118i

F1_Node055

SV10_Fdr1

-0.063-0.068i

-0.071-0.066i

F1_Node057

SV11_Fdr1

-0.025-0.039i

-0.033-0.038i

F1_Node058

GV13_Fdr1

-0.089-0.072i

-0.096-0.071i

-3.231-2.201i

-3.963-1.76i

Current from vaults
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Table A.4—Power flows for simulation with 90% PV penetration
From Node

To Node

Real power flow (kW) without fault

Real power flow (kW) with fault

Main substation

Fdr_1

-3231.39

15,885.42

F1_Node006

SV01_Fdr1

-18.44358978

-106.6785733

F1_Node008

GV02_Fdr1

-104.8973132

-244.75598

F1_Node010

SV02_Fdr1

24.06725323

-162.082662

F1_Node012

GV03_Fdr1

-161.4335793

-263.1239065

F1_Node013

GV01_Fdr1

-548.2762286

-602.8893447

F1_Node017

GV04_Fdr1

-391.4825098

-407.3143925

F1_Node019

GV05_Fdr1

-60.03315505

-73.98539762

F1_Node022

GV06_Fdr1

-125.053579

-134.8040087

F1_Node027

GV07_Fdr1

-12.74666164

-13.54441857

F1_Node028

SV03_Fdr1

2.40080082

-2.922836599

F1_Node030

SV04_Fdr1

22.90622207

16.56187161

F1_Node033

GV08_Fdr1

-304.7559812

-311.7720982

F1_Node034

GV09_Fdr1

-591.7259908

-603.7323814

F1_Node035

GV10_Fdr1

-315.7347308

-317.2899393

F1_Node038

SV05_Fdr1

-27.03998735

-40.15489881

F1_Node041

SV06_Fdr1

40.92356279

31.95861702

F1_Node042

SV07_Fdr1

28.9986259

18.15615969

F1_Node045

GV11_Fdr1

-330.3909848

-332.971727

F1_Node046

GV20_Fdr1

-34.92413582

-39.47870339

F1_Node050

GV12_Fdr1

-48.19626102

-54.4752305

F1_Node053

GV49_Fdr1

-101.1725659

-112.9726132

F1_Node055

SV10_Fdr1

-63.54907375

-71.44639281

F1_Node057

SV11_Fdr1

-24.75098129

-32.64604433

F1_Node058

GV13_Fdr1

-88.69161373

-95.68433422

-3234.002458

-1356.634476

Power flow from vaults
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APPENDIX B – CASE STUDIES FOR FEEDERS 2-7: 30% PV PENETRATION
B1. 30% PV Penetration with Fault in Feeder 2

Figure B.1—Feeder network 2 with fault (30% PV)
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Table B.1—Current calculations for Feeder network 2 simulation (30% PV)
From Node

To Node

Current (pu) without fault

Current (pu) with fault

Main substation

Fdr_2

-1.003-1.96i

13.874-0.099i

F2_Node005

SV12_Fdr2

0.047-0.094i

0.024-0.088i

F2_Node006

GV14_Fdr2

-0.238-0.066i

-0.252-0.064i

F2_Node008

SV13_Fdr2

0.069-0.158i

0.056-0.155i

F2_Node010

GV15_Fdr2

-0.055-0.164i

-0.062-0.169i

F2_Node012

SV14_Fdr2

0.004+0.002i

-0.042+0.023i

F2_Node014

SV15_Fdr2

0.027-0.053i

-0.009-0.035i

F2_Node016

SV16_Fdr2

0.004

-0.045+0.026i

F2_Node017

GV01_Fdr2

-0.148-0.089i

-0.205-0.062i

F2_Node019

SV01_Fdr2

0.006+0.003i

-0.071+0.038i

F2_Node020

SV02_Fdr2

0.075-0.17i

-0.07-0.11i

F2_Node023

GV16_Fdr2

-0.096-0.142i

-0.23-0.081i

F2_Node026

SV17_Fdr2

0.026-0.089i

-0.189+0.022i

F2_Node029

SV11_Fdr2

0.045-0.063i

-0.278+0.109i

F2_Node030

GV17_Fdr2

-0.062-0.187i

-0.506+0.021i

F2_Node033

SV19_Fdr2

0.052-0.14i

-0.314+0.053i

F2_Node035

GV18_Fdr2

-0.067-0.116i

-0.371+0.027i

F2_Node037

SV18_Fdr2

0.092-0.171i

-0.276+0.007i

F2_Node039

SV20_Fdr2

0.041-0.065i

-0.35+0.148i

F2_Node042

GV19_Fdr2

-0.135-0.091i

-0.76+0.232i

F2_Node044

SV26_Fdr2

0

0

F2_Node046

SV21_Fdr2

0.033-0.016i

-0.927+0.549i

F2_Node048

GV21_Fdr2

-0.722-0.092i

-0.87-0.055i

-1.003-1.96i

-5.747+0.435i

Current from vaults
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Table B.2—Power flows for Feeder network 2 simulation (30% PV)
From Node

To Node

Real power flow (kW) without fault

Real power flow (kW) with fault

Main substation

Fdr_2

-1003.409

13873.59

F2_Node005

SV12_Fdr2

46.9915087369

24.5002347165

F2_Node006

GV14_Fdr2

-238.0572710302

-251.8279345384

F2_Node008

SV13_Fdr2

68.5507427217

55.8410135113

F2_Node010

GV15_Fdr2

-55.0810397057

-62.2265350356

F2_Node012

SV14_Fdr2

4.1136670377

-41.9734353496

F2_Node014

SV15_Fdr2

26.4841356374

-9.1543607712

F2_Node016

SV16_Fdr2

4.2391135137

-45.4513768846

F2_Node017

GV01_Fdr2

-148.3894727149

-203.9116061025

F2_Node019

SV01_Fdr2

6.2360840847

-71.2265415709

F2_Node020

SV02_Fdr2

74.4915790677

-69.0443289688

F2_Node023

GV16_Fdr2

-95.8090730692

-228.1056054424

F2_Node026

SV17_Fdr2

25.9494889951

-187.8836362632

F2_Node029

SV11_Fdr2

45.0737630907

-277.3420139980

F2_Node030

GV17_Fdr2

-62.3770168914

-501.1047166145

F2_Node033

SV19_Fdr2

51.5695568589

-310.8381726725

F2_Node035

GV18_Fdr2

-67.6141570735

-367.4535530262

F2_Node037

SV18_Fdr2

91.4689646289

-272.6111719492

F2_Node039

SV20_Fdr2

41.0751467594

-348.4072234609

F2_Node042

GV19_Fdr2

-135.4298266076

-752.9299271241

F2_Node044

SV26_Fdr2

0.0000000003

-0.0000000075

F2_Node046

SV21_Fdr2

32.5929868415

-923.9694899076

F2_Node048

GV21_Fdr2

-721.4822576823

-852.3367783405

-1005.4033768003

-5697.45715980022

Power flow from vaults
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B2. 30% PV Penetration with Fault in Feeder 3

Figure B.2—Feeder network 3 with fault (30% PV)
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Table B.3—Current calculations for Feeder network 3 simulation (30% PV)
From Node

To Node

Current (pu) without fault

Current (pu) with fault

Main substation

Fdr_3

-0.572-1.635i

14.934-0.448i

F3_Node003

SV12_Fdr3

0.042-0.095i

0.025-0.09i

F3_Node005

GV22_Fdr3

-0.082-0.109i

-0.095-0.105i

F3_Node006

SV14_Fdr3

-0.004-0.002i

-0.016+0.001i

F3_Node008

GV23_Fdr3

-0.159-0.038i

-0.172-0.034i

F3_Node011

GV24_Fdr3

0.009-0.053i

-0.038-0.04i

F3_Node012

SV22_Fdr3

0.044-0.097i

-0.005-0.083i

F3_Node015

SV23_Fdr3

0.024-0.053i

-0.088-0.017i

F3_Node018

SV24_Fdr3

0.029-0.062i

-0.106-0.019i

F3_Node020

GV25_Fdr3

-0.013-0.099i

-0.156-0.068i

F3_Node022

SV25_Fdr3

0

0

F3_Node025

GV26_Fdr3

0.008-0.049i

-0.133-0.012i

F3_Node028

GV27_Fdr3

-0.006-0.15i

-0.207-0.107i

F3_Node031

SV21_Fdr3

-0.031+0.005i

-0.322+0.066i

F3_Node033

GV28_Fdr3

-0.107-0.084i

-0.181-0.085i

F3_Node035

SV18_Fdr3

0.062-0.165i

-0.12-0.122i

F3_Node038

GV29_Fdr3

-0.178-0.051i

-0.302-0.03i

F3_Node040

SV26_Fdr3

0

0

F3_Node042

SV05_Fdr3

0.022-0.079i

-0.43+0.125i

F3_Node044

SV27_Fdr3

0.021-0.111i

-0.326+0.054i

F3_Node046

GV30_Fdr3

-0.079-0.105i

-0.373+0.028i

F3_Node049

GV31_Fdr3

-0.027-0.039i

-0.349+0.115i

F3_Node052

GV32_Fdr3

-0.076-0.033i

-0.386+0.104i

F3_Node054

SV28_Fdr3

0.035-0.102i

-0.468+0.137i

F3_Node056

GV33_Fdr3

-0.103-0.066i

-0.57+0.137i

-0.572-1.635i

-4.816-0.043i

Current from vaults
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Table B.4—Power flows for Feeder network 3 simulation (30% PV)
From Node

To Node

Real power flow (kW) without fault

Real power flow (kW) with fault

Main substation

Fdr_3

-571.62

14933.56

F3_Node003

SV12_Fdr3

41.5036694689

25.1684049558

F3_Node005

GV22_Fdr3

-82.2240140727

-94.8017786993

F3_Node006

SV14_Fdr3

-4.1136686210

-15.9383872181

F3_Node008

GV23_Fdr3

-158.8394372013

-171.8052949481

F3_Node011

GV24_Fdr3

9.1620622564

-37.5135990756

F3_Node012

SV22_Fdr3

43.4790489461

-4.7688337820

F3_Node015

SV23_Fdr3

23.7213242858

-87.5775508753

F3_Node018

SV24_Fdr3

28.8549632394

-105.3353287216

F3_Node020

GV25_Fdr3

-12.8298078917

-154.3873390567

F3_Node022

SV25_Fdr3

0.0000002468

-0.0000033443

F3_Node025

GV26_Fdr3

7.8438623515

-132.7000285041

F3_Node028

GV27_Fdr3

-6.4092265820

-205.2705498625

F3_Node031

SV21_Fdr3

-30.6454688856

-321.2138634418

F3_Node033

GV28_Fdr3

-106.8552038129

-179.9847927300

F3_Node035

SV18_Fdr3

61.5647963415

-118.6459345977

F3_Node038

GV29_Fdr3

-177.9590855487

-300.2989326299

F3_Node040

SV26_Fdr3

0.0000025822

0.0000122458

F3_Node042

SV05_Fdr3

21.6562796441

-428.3485126891

F3_Node044

SV27_Fdr3

20.5037234662

-323.4436046910

F3_Node046

GV30_Fdr3

-79.4823365279

-369.2496629802

F3_Node049

GV31_Fdr3

-27.0388130535

-347.3216146090

F3_Node052

GV32_Fdr3

-76.0919029461

-383.2301472166

F3_Node054

SV28_Fdr3

35.0530260567

-464.9185622156

F3_Node056

GV33_Fdr3

-103.3203395017

-565.6188574061

-572.466545759514

-4787.20476209283

Power flow from vaults
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B3. 30% PV Penetration with Fault in Feeder 4

Figure B.3—Feeder network 4 with fault (30% PV)
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Table B.5—Current calculations for Feeder network 4 simulation (30% PV)
From Node

To Node

Current (pu) without fault

Current (pu) with fault

Main substation

Fdr_4

-0.459-1.721i

16.227-1.088i

F4_Node003

SV12_Fdr4

0.041-0.095i

0.022-0.088i

F4_Node005

GV23_Fdr4

-0.159-0.037i

-0.174-0.032i

F4_Node008

SV22_Fdr4

0.044-0.095i

-0.009-0.076i

F4_Node010

GV34_Fdr4

0.016-0.064i

-0.051-0.042i

F4_Node011

SV29_Fdr4

0.05-0.112i

0.011-0.097i

F4_Node014

SV23_Fdr4

0.024-0.052i

-0.1

F4_Node016

GV35_Fdr4

-0.061-0.149i

-0.228-0.076i

F4_Node019

GV26_Fdr4

0.001-0.053i

-0.163+0.017i

F4_Node021

SV24_Fdr4

0.028-0.062i

-0.209+0.073i

F4_Node023

GV36_Fdr4

-0.001-0.092i

-0.115-0.068i

F4_Node025

GV37_Fdr4

0.003-0.095i

-0.282+0.057i

F4_Node028

SV06_Fdr4

0.053-0.111i

-0.101-0.056i

F4_Node033

GV17_Fdr4

-0.091-0.175i

-0.289-0.12i

F4_Node035

GV12_Fdr4

0.001-0.021i

-0.104+0.011i

F4_Node037

SV30_Fdr4

0.025-0.052i

-0.11-0.012i

F4_Node042

GV19_Fdr4

-0.163-0.072i

-0.316-0.045i

F4_Node044

SV28_Fdr4

0.056-0.098i

-0.097-0.067i

F4_Node045

GV32_Fdr4

-0.063-0.031i

-0.159-0.014i

F4_Node049

SV31_Fdr4

0.02-0.019i

-0.139+0.016i

F4_Node051

GV39_Fdr4

0.01-0.094i

-0.088-0.076i

F4_Node053

SV32_Fdr4

0.009-0.007i

-0.115+0.019i

F4_Node056

GV29_Fdr4

-0.162-0.047i

-0.249-0.033i

F4_Node057

SV21_Fdr4

-0.002+0.01i

-0.204+0.045i

F4_Node058

GV38_Fdr4

-0.139-0.102i

-0.275-0.077i

-0.459-1.721i

-3.544-0.743i

Current from vaults
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Table B.6—Power flows for Feeder network 4 simulation (30% PV)
From Node

To Node

Real power flow (kW) without fault

Real power flow (kW) with fault

Main substation

Fdr_4

-458.76

16226.99

F4_Node003

SV12_Fdr4

41.1576145494

22.0672252064

F4_Node005

GV23_Fdr4

-158.7421797593

-174.1033722098

F4_Node008

SV22_Fdr4

43.8808044727

-9.0913574522

F4_Node010

GV34_Fdr4

16.0979391065

-50.6350260173

F4_Node011

SV29_Fdr4

50.3757840538

10.9508975858

F4_Node014

SV23_Fdr4

23.9167556600

-99.0855332589

F4_Node016

GV35_Fdr4

-61.5336911290

-225.7634048178

F4_Node019

GV26_Fdr4

0.7592072975

-162.6326551125

F4_Node021

SV24_Fdr4

27.8152756172

-207.5877918699

F4_Node023

GV36_Fdr4

-0.8418298080

-112.3665599298

F4_Node025

GV37_Fdr4

3.1903935237

-280.0205512709

F4_Node028

SV06_Fdr4

52.3971587514

-100.1330432467

F4_Node033

GV17_Fdr4

-90.9488338436

-286.8488121985

F4_Node035

GV12_Fdr4

1.2420263732

-103.5770159469

F4_Node037

SV30_Fdr4

25.0224966845

-109.8803464368

F4_Node042

GV19_Fdr4

-162.8197583321

-314.6475425957

F4_Node044

SV28_Fdr4

56.1901663589

-96.5749914285

F4_Node045

GV32_Fdr4

-63.4710825083

-158.6387712127

F4_Node049

SV31_Fdr4

20.0514029239

-138.2795282718

F4_Node051

GV39_Fdr4

9.7548928435

-87.8881410709

F4_Node053

SV32_Fdr4

8.9180630638

-115.1363887657

F4_Node056

GV29_Fdr4

-161.6893598582

-247.8725240128

F4_Node057

SV21_Fdr4

-1.9475141454

-203.7451387204

F4_Node058

GV38_Fdr4

-138.5412088465

-274.0900009976

-459.765476950434

-3525.58037405193

Power flow from vaults
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B4. 30% PV Penetration with Fault in Feeder 5

Figure B.4—Feeder network 5 with fault (30% PV)
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Table B.7—Current calculations for Feeder network 5 simulation (30% PV)
From Node

To Node

Current (pu) without fault

Current (pu) with fault

Main substation

Fdr_5

-0.5-1.509i

10.881+0.13i

F5_Node004

SV12_Fdr5

0

0

F5_Node005

SV33_Fdr5

0

0

F5_Node009

SV34_Fdr5

0.027-0.019i

-0.135+0.024i

F5_Node011

GV15_Fdr5

-0.027-0.132i

-0.211-0.09i

F5_Node013

GV37_Fdr5

0.01-0.09i

-0.125-0.06i

F5_Node015

SV04_Fdr5

0.053-0.093i

-0.102-0.055i

F5_Node017

GV08_Fdr5

-0.084-0.012i

-0.258+0.027i

F5_Node019

GV40_Fdr5

-0.065-0.16i

-0.412-0.071i

F5_Node022

GV41_Fdr5

-0.071-0.041i

-0.472+0.061i

F5_Node025

GV42_Fdr5

-0.034-0.134i

-0.172-0.142i

F5_Node026

SV35_Fdr5

0

0

F5_Node029

GV50_Fdr5

-0.193-0.152i

-0.269-0.157i

F5_Node031

SV05_Fdr5

0.065-0.034i

-0.592+0.143i

F5_Node033

SV27_Fdr5

0.061-0.066i

-0.399+0.055i

F5_Node036

SV19_Fdr5

0.055-0.093i

-0.422+0.03i

F5_Node038

GV18_Fdr5

-0.065-0.083i

-0.444

F5_Node042

GV38_Fdr5

-0.121-0.062i

-0.649+0.063i

F5_Node043

SV31_Fdr5

0

0

F5_Node049

GV49_Fdr5

0.046-0.069i

-0.933+0.357i

F5_Node051

GV33_Fdr5

-0.067-0.022i

-0.827+0.27i

F5_Node056

GV43_Fdr5

-0.132-0.073i

-0.678+0.062i

F5_Node060

SV10_Fdr5

0.049-0.028i

-0.442+0.097i

F5_Node061

GV13_Fdr5

0.034-0.05i

-0.456+0.047i

F5_Node064

SV17_Fdr5

0.038-0.05i

-0.312+0.041i

F5_Node066

GV44_Fdr5

-0.078-0.047i

-0.459+0.048i

-0.5-1.509i

-8.768+0.75i

Current from vaults
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Table B.8—Power flows for Feeder network 5 simulation (30% PV)
From Node

To Node

Real power flow (kW) without fault

Real power flow (kW) with fault

Main substation

Fdr_5

-499.62

10881.06

F5_Node004

SV12_Fdr5

0.0000000003

-0.0000000006

F5_Node005

SV33_Fdr5

0.0000000000

-0.0000000009

F5_Node009

SV34_Fdr5

26.5181324124

-134.7090505537

F5_Node011

GV15_Fdr5

-27.2588510153

-209.6500923437

F5_Node013

GV37_Fdr5

10.1949544022

-124.4854134158

F5_Node015

SV04_Fdr5

52.6842121325

-101.0766827905

F5_Node017

GV08_Fdr5

-84.1916104494

-256.6540233321

F5_Node019

GV40_Fdr5

-64.8246743228

-407.5744723133

F5_Node022

GV41_Fdr5

-70.8239257444

-469.2747381793

F5_Node025

GV42_Fdr5

-34.1278363521

-168.1818847510

F5_Node026

SV35_Fdr5

0.0000000005

-0.0000000048

F5_Node029

GV50_Fdr5

-193.2788434728

-263.1916866604

F5_Node031

SV05_Fdr5

64.6997775712

-589.8279137178

F5_Node033

SV27_Fdr5

60.4084341918

-396.8434214542

F5_Node036

SV19_Fdr5

54.7021313233

-418.6762461416

F5_Node038

GV18_Fdr5

-65.1862620036

-440.1891997334

F5_Node042

GV38_Fdr5

-120.5266627715

-644.2365207307

F5_Node043

SV31_Fdr5

0.0000000002

-0.0000000065

F5_Node049

GV49_Fdr5

45.6009186687

-928.3855645005

F5_Node051

GV33_Fdr5

-66.6197264715

-820.5163473702

F5_Node056

GV43_Fdr5

-131.3866201358

-672.6775910582

F5_Node060

SV10_Fdr5

48.8075983400

-439.5759515042

F5_Node061

GV13_Fdr5

33.9847313019

-452.5774221458

F5_Node064

SV17_Fdr5

37.4420370306

-310.1316316634

F5_Node066

GV44_Fdr5

-78.0212334445

-455.5930479608

-501.203318808111

-8704.02890233268
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B5. 30% PV Penetration with Fault in Feeder 6

Figure B.5—Feeder network 6 with fault (30% PV)
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Table B.9—Current calculations for Feeder network 6 simulation (30% PV)
From Node

To Node

Current (pu) without fault

Current (pu) with fault

Main substation

Fdr_6

-0.74-1.845i

14.279-0.776i

F6_Node004

SV15_Fdr6

0.022-0.053i

0.004-0.047i

F6_Node006

SV16_Fdr6

-0.003-0.002i

-0.022+0.004i

F6_Node008

GV02_Fdr6

-0.021-0.048i

-0.04-0.042i

F6_Node012

GV04_Fdr6

-0.099-0.094i

-0.139-0.082i

F6_Node013

SV33_Fdr6

0

0

F6_Node015

SV36_Fdr6

0.003-0.002i

-0.029+0.007i

F6_Node018

GV45_Fdr6

-0.136-0.075i

-0.161-0.069i

F6_Node020

SV34_Fdr6

0.004-0.048i

-0.015-0.045i

F6_Node022

GV06_Fdr6

-0.044-0.052i

-0.062-0.052i

F6_Node025

GV24_Fdr6

0.011-0.052i

-0.032-0.038i

F6_Node027

GV34_Fdr6

0.018-0.064i

-0.04-0.046i

F6_Node028

SV29_Fdr6

0.052-0.112i

0.013-0.1i

F6_Node030

GV35_Fdr6

-0.057-0.147i

-0.205-0.101i

F6_Node034

SV05_Fdr6

0.024-0.077i

-0.263+0.012i

F6_Node036

GV46_Fdr6

-0.014-0.101i

-0.167-0.064i

F6_Node038

SV07_Fdr6

0.065-0.118i

-0.175-0.049i

F6_Node040

GV43_Fdr6

-0.174-0.116i

-0.372-0.069i

F6_Node043

SV30_Fdr6

0.02-0.046i

-0.154-0.007i

F6_Node045

SV20_Fdr6

0.01-0.048i

-0.174-0.002i

F6_Node046

GV49_Fdr6

0.009-0.106i

-0.255-0.052i

F6_Node048

GV41_Fdr6

-0.103-0.08i

-0.424+0.027i

F6_Node050

GV09_Fdr6

-0.179-0.094i

-0.67+0.084i

F6_Node053

GV47_Fdr6

-0.08-0.14i

-0.597+0.068i

F6_Node055

SV31_Fdr6

-0.001-0.024i

-0.608+0.267i

F6_Node057

GV48_Fdr6

-0.069-0.143i

-0.78+0.192i

-0.74-1.845i

-5.371-0.157i

Current from vaults

81

Table B.10—Power flows for Feeder network 6 simulation (30% PV)
From Node

To Node

Real power flow (kW) without fault

Real power flow (kW) with fault

Main substation

Fdr_6

-739.99

14278.85

F6_Node004

SV15_Fdr6

22.0147462175

3.5964064463

F6_Node006

SV16_Fdr6

-3.4752751561

-21.6418904175

F6_Node008

GV02_Fdr6

-20.8673833336

-40.0673074749

F6_Node012

GV04_Fdr6

-98.9925665155

-138.8696735551

F6_Node013

SV33_Fdr6

0.0000000896

-0.0000003858

F6_Node015

SV36_Fdr6

3.2141336317

-28.6541470625

F6_Node018

GV45_Fdr6

-135.7652395062

-161.1574292782

F6_Node020

SV34_Fdr6

4.2034698857

-14.8818565569

F6_Node022

GV06_Fdr6

-44.0327696853

-62.3290326289

F6_Node025

GV24_Fdr6

11.0064005395

-31.7081262164

F6_Node027

GV34_Fdr6

18.3233687635

-40.0294668228

F6_Node028

SV29_Fdr6

51.9085419627

13.5811638134

F6_Node030

GV35_Fdr6

-56.6268569777

-202.8905917067

F6_Node034

SV05_Fdr6

24.2202112083

-262.3559840883

F6_Node036

GV46_Fdr6

-14.3938246112

-165.3214436206

F6_Node038

SV07_Fdr6

64.6014535397

-173.5474941626

F6_Node040

GV43_Fdr6

-173.4559638960

-369.5272181159

F6_Node043

SV30_Fdr6

19.6248638339

-153.7513370707

F6_Node045

SV20_Fdr6

10.1576575019

-172.9931572313

F6_Node046

GV49_Fdr6

8.4706645596

-253.9137828758

F6_Node048

GV41_Fdr6

-102.6058988702

-421.9165628224

F6_Node050

GV09_Fdr6

-178.4872612474

-665.4439025203

F6_Node053

GV47_Fdr6

-80.5536087790

-591.3606413972

F6_Node055

SV31_Fdr6

-0.5921792407

-606.4324528625

F6_Node057

GV48_Fdr6

-68.8297817243

-771.4942247476

-740.933097809422

-5336.70655980752

Power flow from vaults
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B6. 30% PV Penetration with Fault in Feeder 7

Figure B.6—Feeder network 7 with fault (30% PV)
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Table B.11—Current calculations for Feeder network 7 simulation (30% PV)
From Node

To Node

Current (pu) without fault

Current (pu) with fault

Main substation

Fdr_7

-0.526-1.92i

15.159-0.783i

F7_Node003

GV22_Fdr7

-0.082-0.109i

-0.095-0.104i

F7_Node006

SV36_Fdr7

-0.001-0.003i

-0.034+0.007i

F7_Node008

GV45_Fdr7

-0.139-0.076i

-0.166-0.068i

F7_Node011

GV05_Fdr7

-0.01-0.024i

-0.086-0.001i

F7_Node012

SV13_Fdr7

0.072-0.151i

0.016-0.131i

F7_Node016

GV46_Fdr7

-0.018-0.098i

-0.188-0.047i

F7_Node019

GV16_Fdr7

-0.095-0.123i

-0.256-0.072i

F7_Node022

SV02_Fdr7

0.089-0.137i

-0.203-0.04i

F7_Node024

GV03_Fdr7

-0.016-0.038i

-0.177+0.012i

F7_Node026

GV20_Fdr7

-0.002-0.002i

-0.155+0.047i

F7_Node028

GV44_Fdr7

-0.109-0.074i

-0.263-0.03i

F7_Node031

GV40_Fdr7

-0.085-0.17i

-0.369-0.061i

F7_Node033

SV35_Fdr7

0.063-0.138i

0.061-0.139i

F7_Node035

SV03_Fdr7

0.032-0.041i

-0.162+0.038i

F7_Node037

GV25_Fdr7

0.008-0.066i

-0.188-0.009i

F7_Node038

SV15_Fdr7

0

0

F7_Node042

GV30_Fdr7

-0.074-0.093i

-0.285-0.018i

F7_Node044

GV31_Fdr7

-0.022-0.027i

-0.226+0.044i

F7_Node046

GV49_Fdr7

0.014-0.097i

-0.386+0.05i

F7_Node048

GV48_Fdr7

-0.067-0.125i

-0.379-0.03i

F7_Node050

GV39_Fdr7

-0.003-0.086i

-0.208-0.015i

F7_Node052

GV47_Fdr7

-0.079-0.123i

-0.388-0.019i

F7_Node054

SV32_Fdr7

-0.009+0.007i

-0.271+0.101i

F7_Node056

SV21_Fdr7

0

0

F7_Node058

GV27_Fdr7

0.006-0.127i

-0.284-0.032i

-0.526-1.92i

-4.596-0.413i
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Table B.12—Power flows for Feeder network 7 simulation (30% PV)
From Node

To Node

Real power flow (kW) without fault

Real power flow (kW) with fault

Main substation

Fdr_7

-526.32

15158.57

F7_Node003

GV22_Fdr7

-82.3724065921

-94.6956051689

F7_Node006

SV36_Fdr7

-0.8240722683

-33.5462843794

F7_Node008

GV45_Fdr7

-138.9624292609

-165.8179625283

F7_Node011

GV05_Fdr7

-9.7606930103

-86.0371442733

F7_Node012

SV13_Fdr7

72.0070133255

16.1075485099

F7_Node016

GV46_Fdr7

-17.6831284371

-186.6211390294

F7_Node019

GV16_Fdr7

-95.1374170917

-254.3296621785

F7_Node022

SV02_Fdr7

89.0526469249

-201.6715710494

F7_Node024

GV03_Fdr7

-16.2728438930

-175.8331147917

F7_Node026

GV20_Fdr7

-2.1597715371

-154.4510389362

F7_Node028

GV44_Fdr7

-108.4660032585

-260.9786118229

F7_Node031

GV40_Fdr7

-84.7187437375

-365.3018980944

F7_Node033

SV35_Fdr7

62.7571198163

62.7570254786

F7_Node035

SV03_Fdr7

31.4251247765

-161.7438276520

F7_Node037

GV25_Fdr7

8.2607731358

-187.1451829135

F7_Node038

SV15_Fdr7

0.0000000002

-0.0000000033

F7_Node042

GV30_Fdr7

-74.1980812190

-282.8151616231

F7_Node044

GV31_Fdr7

-22.1002356107

-224.9538343524

F7_Node046

GV49_Fdr7

14.0128853547

-384.1501199626

F7_Node048

GV48_Fdr7

-66.6749270560

-376.2521775972

F7_Node050

GV39_Fdr7

-3.3714805706

-206.5068309396

F7_Node052

GV47_Fdr7

-79.1987678862

-384.7101404376

F7_Node054

SV32_Fdr7

-8.9180439369

-270.0085060440

F7_Node056

SV21_Fdr7

-0.0000000001

-0.0000000039

F7_Node058

GV27_Fdr7

5.6333584141

-281.7235401924

-527.670123618212

-4565.7331748166

Power flow from vaults
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APPENDIX C – VOLTAGE LIMITS
The steady state voltage is the voltage a Customer can expect to receive under normal operating
conditions. Since the loads on a utility system are constantly changing, it is impossible to
maintain a completely constant voltage. Thus the Company will provide voltage regulation to
keep the steady state voltage within the ranges shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 as indicated by ANSI
standard C84.1.
Table C.1—ANSI C84.1 Voltage Limits (Service Voltage)
Service Voltage (1)
Range A (2)(4)
Maximum
+5%
Minimum
-5%

Range B (2)(6)
+5.83%
-8.33%

1. Service voltage is measured at the point of common coupling between Customer and

Company. Jurisdictional Public Service Commissions may specify other voltage
limits.
Table C.2—ANSI C84.1 Voltage Limits (Utilization Voltage)
Utilization Voltage (6)
Range A (2)(4)
Maximum (equipment rated >600 V)
+5%
Maximum (equipment rated <600 V)
+4.17%
Minimum
-8.33%(-10% (3))
2.
3.
4.
5.

Range B (2)(6)
+5.83%
+5.83%
-11.67%(-13.33%(3))

Voltage limits in % deviation from nominal
For circuits with no lighting equipment
Range A applies to normal operations
Range B applies for short duration and/or abnormal conditions on the utility system
(excluding fault conditions and transients).
6. Utilization Voltage is measured at the equipment using the electricity.
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